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SECRECY AND SETTLEMENTS: IS THE NEW JERSEY CHARITABLE
IMMUNITY ACT JUSTIFIED IN LIGHT OF THE CLERGY
SEXUAL ABUSE CRISIS?
I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

Overview of the Problem

1
In tort law, there is one basic question: who will pay the damages?
2
This question is particularly relevant in the clergy sexual abuse crisis currently impacting the Roman Catholic Church. 3 In the majority of states,

1. See FRANKJ. VANDALL ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND PROBLEMS 1 (2d ed. 2003)
(explaining that question of who will be responsible for paying damages underlies
all tort actions); Frank L. Maraist, Of Envelopes and Legends: Reflections on Tort Law,
61 LA. L. REv. 153, 153 (2002) (noting that tort law requires resolution of only one
issue: whether it is preferable to impose cost upon actor or victim).
2. The phrase "clergy sexual abuse crisis" refers to the numerous allegations
of clergy sexual abuse of minors, which victims began reporting in the early 1980s.
See Rev. John J. Coughlin, The Clergy Sexual Abuse Crisis and the Spirit of Canon Law,
44 B.C. L. REv. 977, 977 (2003) (using phrase to refer to sexual abuse of minors by
priests). Scholars have also used the term "scandal" to refer to the revelations
about clergy sexual abuse. See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., ProsecutingDioceses and Bishops, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2003) (referring to allegations of clergy sexual
abuse as "scandal"); Mark E. Chopko, Shaping the Church: Overcoming the Twin Challenges of Secularization and Scandal, 53 CATH. U. L. REv. 125, 125 (2003) (same);
Susan Vivian Mangold, Reforming Child Protection in Response to the Catholic Church
Child Sexual Abuse Scandal, 14 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 155, 155 (2003) (same);

Rev. Raymond C. O'Brien, Clergy, Sex and the American Way, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 363,
373 (2004) (same); Arthur Gross Schaefer & Dan Van Bogaert, The ChangingLegal
Landscapefor Clergy, 42 CATH. LAW. 117, 117 (2002) (same); Lisa M. Smith, Lifting
the Veil of Secrecy: Mandatoy Child Abuse Reporting Statutes May Encourage the Catholic
Church to Report Priests Who Molest Children, 18 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 409, 412 (1994)
(same); Catharine Pierce Wells, Churches, Charities, and Corrective Justice: Making
Churches Pay for the Sins of Their Clergy, 44 B.C. L. REv. 1201, 1227 (2003) (same).
Clergy sexual abuse has been the subject of extensive media coverage. See Coughlin, supra at 977 (noting that revelations of clergy sexual abuse "have drawn intense

media scrutiny"); Smith, supra,at 409 (acknowledging that clergy sexual abuse has
been "hot topic" in media); Kristina Henderson, Clergy Scandal Biggest Story of '02;

Religion Writers Vote It 4 of Top 10,

WASH.

TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at A02 ("[C]lergy

sexual abuse scandal... was voted the top religion story of 2002 by members of the
Religion Newswriters Association."). See generallyJASON BERRY, LEAD Us NOT INTO
TEMPTATION: CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN (2002) (discussing prevelance of clergy sexual abuse in Catholic church); INVESTIGATIVE STAFF
OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, BETRAYAL: THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (2002)
[hereinafter BETRAYAL] (reporting revelations about clergy sexual abuse scandal,
primarily events occurring in Boston); Laurie Goodstein, Decades of Damage; Trail of
Pain in Church Crisis Leads to Nearly Every Diocese, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, § 1, at 1
(providing overview of clergy sexual abuse scandal); Robin Washington, Panel:
Church Must Changefor Crisis to End, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 26, 2004, at 18 (reporting that clergy sexual abuse crisis continues).
3. See Wells, supra note 2, at 1202 (describing concerns raised as result of sexual abuse in church); see also Angela C. Carmella, The Protection of Children and
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victims can seek damages from both the abusive clergy member and the
church. 4 Access to the church's funds is important because priests typically have limited assets. 5 In New Jersey, however, victims of clergy sexual
Young People: Catholic and Constitutional Visions of ResponsibleFreedom, 44 B.C. L. Rrv.
1031, 1041 (2003) ("[F]or cases of clergy sexual abuse of minors, ajurisdiction's
approach is critical to whether a victim can sue for damages."). Disclosure of
clergy sexual abuse has led to public demands for compensation. See Wells, supra
note 2, at 1202. "Even the most restrained voices have demanded that the victims
be compensated and the offenders be punished." Id. "Large civil judgments" are
one component of the remedy sought. Id. For example, in a current civil action
against Cardinal Bernard Law and Bishop Howard Hubbard, one plaintiff is seeking $5 million. See Michele Morgan Bolton, Diocese Asks for Time to Appeal Trial
Location; Church Leaders Want Sex Abuse Lawsuit to Be Heard in Albany, TIMES UNION

(Albany, N.Y.), Oct. 14, 2004, at B8 (describing monetary damages sought in clergy
sexual abuse action). The plaintiff is alleging that priest Dozia Wilson sexually
abused him in the early 1980s. See id. (reporting character of allegations). He is
further alleging that both Law and Hubbard knew about Wilson's pedophiliac behavior and, despite this knowledge, protected the priest by transferring him
among different parishes. See id. (describing cause of action against Law and Hubbard). The $5 million judgment plaintiff is seeking is not anomalous when compared to other civil judgments awarded nationwide. See, e.g., Maggie Mulvihill,
Church Crisis;Insurers, Church Usually Settle Sex Abuse Cases, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 10,
2002, at 6 (noting that Texas jury awarded eleven victims of clergy sexual abuse
$119.6 million); David O'Reilly, Camden Diocese Agrees to Settle Sex-Abuse Suit, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Mar. 14, 2003, at A01 (remarking that twenty-three plaintiffs in clergy
sexual abuse action sought $50 million). It is important to keep in mind, however,
that the church often settles these civil actions for amounts less than that sought by
plaintiffs. See Mulvihill, supra at 6 ("[C] hurch officials nearly always settle to avoid
embarrassing and public courtroom battles."). For example, in Texas, after ajury
awarded $119.6 million to eleven victims of clergy sexual abuse, the Catholic Archdiocese for San Antonio negotiated a settlement of $35.9 million. See id. (explaining that church did not actually pay amount awarded by jury).
4. See PatrickJ. Schiltz, The Impact of Clergy Sexual Misconduct Litigation on Religious Liberty, 44 B.C. L. REv. 949, 957 (2003) ("In a typical clergy sexual misconduct
lawsuit, the plaintiff sues the pastor who committed the abuse, the congregation
that employed him, and the religious organization with which the pastor and congregation were affiliated."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E cmt.
d (1979) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT TORTS] (stating that majority of jurisdictions
abolished charitable immunity); Mark Chopko, Stating Claims Against Religious Institutions, 44 B.C. L. REv. 1089, 1089-90 (2003) (warning that "[t]he demise of charitable immunity generally, and its limitation in virtually every jurisdiction means
that [religious organizations] must pay attention to their legal relationships and
conduct"); James T. O'Reilly & JoAnn M. Strasser, Clergy Sexual Misconduct: Confronting the Difficult Constitutional and Institutional Liability Issues, 7 ST. THOIAS L.
REv. 31, 60 (1994) (explaining thatjudicial abandonment of charitable immunity
in tort actions against religious entities began in 1950s and is now majority
position).
5. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 957 (noting that most "pastors are judgmentproof"); see also U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OccupationalOutlook Handbook: Roman Catholic
Priests [hereinafter Occupational Handbook], at http://stats.bls.gov/oco/ocos063.
htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2004) (providing average salary for Roman Catholic
priests). Priests' salaries vary depending on the particular diocese. See id. (explaining lack of uniformity in priests' salaries). A 2002 survey of the National Federation of Priests' Councils revealed that average salaries range between $15,291 and
$18,478 per year. See id. (providing average salary figures for Roman Catholic
priests). Benefits such as room and board are not included in these figures. See id.
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abuse cannot reach into the church coffers. 6 The New Jersey Charitable
Immunity Act shields the church from tort liability in order to ensure its
7
assets are not depleted.
(noting types of compensation not included in salary figures). The lack of priests'
assets shifts plaintiffs' focus from the clergy member to the church. See O'Reilly &
Strasser, supra note 4, at 38 (noting that plaintiffs sue churches in clergy misconduct cases because priests are "often bankrupt or essentially penniless" and
churches have "both insurance and assets"); see also Schiltz, supranote 4, at 957-58
(explaining how churches become parties in clergy sexual abuse litigation).
6. See Chopko, supra note 4, at 1090 n.1 ("In NewJersey, which preserves charitable immunity, a beneficiary of the charity may not maintain an action in tort for
Rivera v. Alonso, No. 88the negligence of the entity and its personnel."); see, e.g.,
5529, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12378, at *2 (D.NJ. Oct. 18, 1989) (holding that Charitable Immunity Act precludes action against Diocese of Paterson arising out of
clergy sexual abuse); Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 472 A.2d 531, 536
(N.J. 1984) (holding that Charitable Immunity Act precludes archdiocese liability
in negligent hiring action stemming from clergy sexual abuse).
7. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 2004) (establishing charitable immunity for "nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes"). The Charitable Immunity Act states:
a. No nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively
for religious, charitable or educational purposes or its trustees, directors,
officers, employees, agents, servants or volunteers shall, except as is hereinafter set forth, be liable to respond in damages to any person who shall
suffer damage from the negligence of any agent or servant of such corporation, society or association, where such person is a beneficiary, to
whatever degree, of the works of such nonprofit corporation, society or
association; provided, however, that such immunity from liability shall
not extend to any person who shall suffer damage from the negligence of
such corporation, society, or association or of its agents or servants where
such person is one unconcerned in and unrelated to and outside of the
benefactions of such corporation, society or association
c. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to grant immunity to: (1) any
trustee, director, officer, employee, agent, servant or volunteer causing
damage by a willful, wanton or grossly negligent act of commission or
omission, including sexual assault and other crimes of a sexual nature;
(2) any trustee, director, officer, employee, agent, servant or volunteer
causing damage as the result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle; or (3) an independent contractor of a nonprofit corporation, society
or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable, educational
or hospital purposes.
Id.; see also Schultz, 472 A.2d at 537 (discussing legislative intent of Act). Subsection
(c) of the Charitable Immunity Act applies only to individuals-the individuals
named in this section are not immune from liability if they "[cause] damage by a
willful, wanton, or grossly negligent act... including sexual assault." See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:53A-7(c) (West 2004) (creating exception to immunity provided to individuals under Charitable Immunity Act). Notably, if an individual affiliated with a
charitable organization does commit a grossly negligent act, the charitable organization retains its immunity. See John Chadwick, N.J.Law Still Blocks Suits on Sex
Abuse by Clergy; Church FightsBills to Limit Immunity, THE REC. (Bergen County, N.J.),
May 2, 2003, at A01 (noting that, even where employees of charitable organizations are grossly negligent, "the organization as a whole cannot be held liable.").
The distinction is important because, in the Roman Catholic Church, only the
church itself has the resources needed to recompense victims of clergy sexual
abuse-priests typically have meager assets insufficient to pay large tortjudgments.
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Clergy sexual abuse of minors has long plagued the Catholic
Church. 8 During the early 1980s, scandal erupted, bringing the problem
to the forefront of the American conscience. 9 Specifically in 1983, victims
of Roman Catholic priest Gilbert Gauthe filed numerous lawsuits alleging
the priest had sexually abused them as minors. 10 This litigation was the

For a discussion of the limitations of priests' assets and the importance of access to
church funds, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
8. See Thomas P. Doyle & Stephen C. Rubino, Catholic Clergy Sexual Abuse Meets
the Civil Law, 31 FoRDHAM URa. L.J. 549, 574 (2004) (explaining that clergy sexual
abuse has impacted Catholic Church for duration of its "two-thousand year history"); see also Coughlin, supra note 2, at 977 (stating that clergy sexual abuse is
"not novel in the history of the Roman Catholic Church"); Goodstein, supra note
2, at 1 (remarking that New York Times survey revealed clergy sexual abuse occurring in 1930s).
9. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 554-55 ("Cases involving clergy sexual
abuse came to the forefront of public knowledge starting in 1984 ....");see also
Anthony DePalma, Church Scandal Resurrects Old Hurt in Louisiana Bayou, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2003, at Al (noting that national attention received by abusive
priest in Louisiana "opened the way for" clergy sexual abuse civil suits nationwide).
The National Council of Catholic Bishops also made Pope John Paul II aware of
the problem of clergy sexual abuse in America in the early 1980s. SeeJo Renee
Formicola, The Vatican, the American Bishops, and the Church-State Ramifications of Clerical Sexual Abuse, J. CHURCH & ST., June 22, 2004, at 479 (discussing pope's awareness of clergy sexual abuse problem in America).
10. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 952-53 (describing litigation resulting from
Gauthe's abuse). Revelations about Gilbert Gauthe's pedophiliac behavior began
"after one of his loyal flock of alter boys was hospitalized with rectal bleeding."
DePalma, supra note 9, at Al (recounting discovery of Gauthe's abuse). Gauthe
ultimately admitted to abusing thirty-seven boys, but did not apologize for his actions. See id. (discussing Gauthe's admission). The church paid thirty-five of the
victims settlements, which amounted to "hundreds of thousands of dollars each."
Id.; see also Fred Bayles, Abuse Victims Say It's Not About the Money, USA TODAY, Sept.
10, 2003, at 8D (listing Gauthe settlement among one of the "larger known settlements"). Most settlements included confidentiality agreements. See DePalma,
supra note 9, at Al (noting reluctance to discuss Gauthe settlements). Two civil
cases did go to trial and juries awarded damages in excess of $1 million. See id.
(discussing civil actions against Gauthe). Information is only available regarding
one of the civil actions, brought by Glenn and Faye Gastal on behalf of their minor
son, because the court sealed most documents filed in lawsuits against Gauthe. See
Kathy Sawyer, Priest's Child-Molestation Case Traumatizes Catholic Community, WASH.
PosT, June 9,1985, at A6 ("[P]arents and church officials kept the matter quiet to
protect the children."). The Gastals brought a $12 million civil action against
Gauthe and the Roman Catholic Church. See Jury Awards $1 Million to Boy Among
36 Molested by Priest, CHI. TRIBUNE, Feb. 8, 1986, at 3C (describing Gastals' civil
action). Testimony during the trial revealed that Gauthe began abusing the victim
when he was seven years old. See id. (same). The jury awarded the victim $1 million. See id. (same). In addition to civil actions, Gauthe also faced criminal prosecution. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 549 (discussing criminal proceedings
against Gauthe). He pled guilty to thirty-nine counts of sexual battery and the
court sentenced him to twenty years in prison. See id. (same); see also DePalma,
supra note 9, at A] (discussing Gauthe's plea bargain and subsequent release from
prison); Goodstein, supra note 2, at 1 (recounting Gauthe's punishment and its
costs on society).
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"spark" that ignited the church sexual abuse scandal." Following the revelations about Gauthe, there was a marked rise in clergy sexual miscon12
duct litigation.
In 2002, the church scandal heated up with a renewed fervor. 13 In
January of that year, the Boston Globe uncovered evidence that Roman
Catholic priest John Geoghan had abused over one hundred and thirty
boys in the past thirty years. 14 The priest had bounced from parish to
11. See Schiltz, supranote 4, at 952 (characterizing Gauthe litigation as "spark"
that ignited victims' anger over abuse); see also Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at
554 ("There is little doubt that the publicity surrounding the [Gauthe] case was a
major catalyst for the legal and cultural explosions that have rocked the Catholic
Church."); Timothy Liam Epstein, Note, Surviving Exemption: Should the Church Exemption to ERISA Still Be in Effect?, 11 ELDER L.J. 395, 414 (2003) (noting that
Gauthe litigation "broke open the modern scandal"); Nicholas Wapshott, Devious
Priest at Heart of National Scanda4 TIMES (London), Aug. 25, 2003, at 13 (characterizing Gauthe's abuse as event propelling clergy sexual abuse to "national issue").
12. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 953 (describing effects of Gauthe litigation).
13. See Pam Belluck, Scandals in the Church: The Overview; Law, Citing Abuse
Scandal, Quits as Boston Archdiocese andAsks forForgiveness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2002,
at A6 (recounting most recent eruption in clergy abuse scandal); Cathy Lynn
Grossman, A Guide to Issues, Players at U.S. Bishop's Summit, USA TODAY, June 10,
2002, at 10D (explaining that clergy sexual abuse reached crisis level after events in
January 2002 "reignited a smoldering problem"); see also BETRAYAL, supra note 2
(describing Boston Globe's revelations about Father John Geoghan and Cardinal
Bernard Law, which unleashed wave of media attention on clergy sexual abuse);
O'Brien, supra note 2, at 373 (noting that "current scandal" began in January 2002
when Boston Globe reported Geoghan's sexual abuse of minors). Although it was
clergy sexual abuse cases involving Cardinal Law in Boston that reignited the scandal, the Boston revelations "started a chain reaction" nationwide. See Martin
Kasendorf et al., Boston Church Scandal Starts Chain Reaction, USA TODAY, Dec. 19,
2002, at 13A (describing impact of Boston revelations). In 2002, bishops across
the country began admitting to wrongdoing and hundreds of priests resigned or
were dismissed. See id. (same). The 2002 scandal was distinguishable in some ways
from the one in the early 1980s. See O'Brien, supra note 2, at 373 (pointing out
difference in 2002 reports of clergy sexual abuse from reports in 1980s). For example, there was a large amount of media coverage concentrated in a short
amount of time. See id. (remarking that Boston Globe published many articles in a
short time period about clergy sexual abuse); cf Matthew Felling, Sex, Lies, and
Vaticangate,WORLD AND I, Dec. 1, 2002, at 60 (describing extensive media coverage
and offering explanation for it). Additionally, there was a growing perception that
"some underlying systemic cause" had contributed to the scandal. See O'Brien,
supra note 2, at 373 (identifying additional reason 2002 scandal differed from
clergy sexual abuse scandal in 1980s); see also Eileen McNamara, Church Ills Run
Deep, BosToN GLOBE, Jan. 27, 2002, at BI (noting that church must address "systemic ills" underlying abuse scandal). Finally, victims bringing actions during the
2002 scandal did so as adults rather than as children, while victims in the 1984
Gauthe scandal brought contemporaneous actions following the revelation that an
alter boy had been sexually abused. See DePalma, supra note 9, at Al (describing
difference between 2002 and 1980s clergy sexual abuse scandals). "[U]nlike the
adults in Boston who have .. .brought complaints about events decades old, [victims of Gilbert Gauthe] could confront their abuser and see him punished when
they were still boys." Id.
14. See Belluck, supra note 13, at A6 (describing revelations in abuse scandal
resulting from Boston Globe's investigation). See generally Michael Rezendes, Church
Allowed Abuse By PriestFor Years Aware of Geoghan Record, Archdiocese Still Shuttled Him
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parish, victimizing mainly prepubescent males.' 5 Despite Cardinal Bernard Law's knowledge of Geoghan's transgressions, the cardinal repeatedly allowed the priest to return to church parishes. 16 Following the
Boston Globe's revelations, hundreds of people across the United States

raised allegations of clergy sexual abuse. 17 The flood of new allegations
raised questions about the role of the church in the scandal-specifically,
18
questions arose as to whether there was an "underlying systemic cause."
The New Jersey legislature chose to revive charitable immunity in
1958, more than twenty years before the media exposed the clergy sexual
abuse scandal in the 1980s.19 The revelations about clergy sexual abuse
did not alter NewJersey courts' willingness to apply charitable immunityfrom Parish to Parish, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2002, at Al (discussing Geoghan's
abuse and Cardinal Law's knowledge of abuse). The Boston Globe uncovered the
evidence about Geoghan after reviewing "public files" of the pending civil lawsuits
against the priest. See id. (describing unearthing of evidence as unprecedented, yet
"remarkably skeletal" due to sealed documents). The newspaper was also instrumental in effectuating the release of previously sealed documents from "lawsuits
about the church's supervision of Geoghan." See id. (commenting on Boston Globe's
successful motion to have documents released to public).
15. See Rezendes, supra note 14, at Al (discussing Geoghan's actions and
victims).
16. See id. (describing Geoghan's reassignments to multiple parishes). In
1984, Cardinal Law was aware of Geoghan's previous sexual abuse. See id. (explaining Cardinal Law's knowledge during Geoghan's transfers among parishes).
"[C] omplaints that Geoghan had abused children at [St. Brendan's in Dorchester,
Massachusetts] prompted Law to remove him." Id. Notwithstanding this knowledge, Cardinal Law transferred Geoghan to St. Julia's parish in Weston, Massachusetts, where the priest assumed responsibility for several youth groups. See id.
(same). Allegations of sexual abuse in St. Julia's parish surfaced. See id. (noting
Geoghan's pattern of abuse continued). Geoghan received treatment as a result of
the new allegations. See id. (discussing response to allegations of Geoghan's
abuse). Upon completion of treatment, however, the Boston Archdiocese permitted Geoghan to return to St. Julia's. See id. (same). There, Geoghan resumed his
sexual abuse of minors. See id. (noting pattern of abuse continued). "The civil and
criminal allegations Geoghan faces ...suggest that he allegedly abused at least 30
more boys after Law sent him to [St. Julia's] in 1984-both before and after the
half year's [treatment] in 1989." Id.
17. See Fred Bayles, Abuse Victims Rock to Lawyers, USA TODAY, July 31, 2002, at
ID (citing Associated Press survey that "found 300 [clergy sexual abuse] cases had
been filed around the country in the first five months of 2002"); Kevin Clarke,
Whitewash or Renewal?, U.S. CATHOLIC, June 1, 2003, at 12 ("[H]undreds of stories
[following the Boston Globe's revelations] report new allegations of cover-ups across
the country."); Sam Dillon & Leslie Wayne, Scandals in the Church: The Money, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 2002, at Al (reporting results of Associated Press survey).
18. See O'Brien, supra note 2, at 373 ("[T]his particular scandal was dominated by the 'growing and widespread persuasion that the scandal had occurred
not simply because of the moral weakness that touches us all... but because there
is some underlying systemic cause."'); see also McNamara, supranote 13, at BI (expressing opinion that "systemic ills" contributed to scandal).
19. See Alicia Bottari, The CharitableImmunity Act, 5 SETON HALL LEGiS. J. 61, 66
(1980) (noting that NewJersey legislature revived charitable immunity on July 22,
1958). For a discussion of the legislative history of the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act, see infra notes 71-77, 123-34 and accompanying text.
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the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the Charitable Immunity Act in

Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese.2 0 In Schultz, the court extended immunity to the church in negligent hiring actions arising out of the sexual
abuse of minors. 2 1 Because a bevy of new allegations nationwide recently
renewed questions about church liability, the time has come to reevaluate
the statute and its place in an environment where clergy sexual abuse of
22
minors is an unfortunate reality.
B.

Overview of the Note

This Note discusses the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act in light
of the Catholic clergy sexual abuse scandal. Part II tracks the development
of the NewJersey Charitable Immunity Act.2 3 Part III explains the justifications for charitable immunity and explores the applicable counterarguments. 2 4 Part IV considers whether the Charitable Immunity Act is both
appropriate and effective in light of the clergy sexual abuse scandal in the
Roman Catholic Church. 25 Specifically, this Note considers whether the
church itself contributed to the scandal and whether the economic justification for the Act can be reconciled with the financial reality of settlements entered into by the church. 26 Finally, Part V concludes that New
Jersey should amend the Charitable Immunity Act to reduce the impedi20. See 472 A.2d 531, 535 (N.J. 1984) (discussing statute's applicability).
21. See id. at 536 (stating holding). In Schultz, the NewJersey Supreme Court
held that a victim of clergy sexual abuse could not hold the archdiocese employing
the abuser liable under the theory of negligent hiring. See id. (stating that cause of
action was negligence in hiring). The archdiocese was a charitable organization
under the meaning of the Act. See id. (discussing characteristics of charitable organizations). For a discussion of Schultz, see infra notes 78-91 and accompanying
text.
22. See generally Terrence Dopp, NJ Senate Panel to FurtherExamine Allowing Suits
Against the Church (Jan. 27, 2004), at www.snapnetwork.org/legislation/nj-senate_
panel-charitable.htm ("Attacking what some call an impediment to lawsuits by victims of clergy sex abuse, the state Senate is considering changes to a 1958 law
protecting non-profit organizations from litigation."); NEW JERSEY SENATE DEMOcRATs, Vitale Statement on Charitable Immunity Reform (Jan. 26, 2004) [hereinafter
Vitale Statement], at http://www.njsendems.com/Releases/04/January/Vitale%20
(exStatement%20on%2OCharitable%20Immunity%2OReform, %201-26-04.htm
plaining that reform is necessary in order to protect minors in NewJersey). For a
discussion of past and current proposed amendments to the NewJersey Charitable
Immunity Act, see infra note 74 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the development of charitable immunity in NewJersey,
from English common law to present, see infra notes 30-91 and accompanying
text.
24. For a discussion ofjustifications for the charitable immunity doctrine and,
more specifically, the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act, see infra notes 92-134
and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the NewJersey Charitable Immunity Act in the context
of the clergy sexual abuse scandal, see infra notes 135-222 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of the church's role in the clergy abuse crisis and its payment of large settlements to abuse victims, see infra notes 149-222 and accompanying text.
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ments victims of clergy sexual abuse encounter in negligent hiring and
27
supervision actions against the church.
In the interest of conciseness, this Note will focus on the Roman Catholic Church because it is the "largest institutional church in America." 28 It
is important to note that clergy sexual abuse of minors is not unique to
29
any particular denomination.
II.
A.
1.

NEW JERSEY CHARITABLE IMMUNITY ACT

HistoricalDevelopment of New Jersey CharitableImmunity Act

Adoption of Common Law Doctrine

In 1925, New Jersey adopted the common law doctrine of charitable
immunity, derived from English common law, in D'Amato v. Orange Memorial Hospital.30 In D'Amato, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered
3
whether a charitable hospital should be liable for its nurses' negligence. '
The court looked to decisions from three states for guidance. 32 All ruled
27. For a discussion of conclusions about the applicability and effectiveness of
the NewJersey Charitable Immunity Act, see infra notes 223-43 and accompanying
text.
28. See O'Brien, supra note 2, at 365 (discussing size of Roman Catholic
Church in United States). The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops reports that, in 2003, there were 63.4 million Catholics in the United States, which
represented 23% of the country's population. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS, Catholic Information Project (Dec. 2003), at http://www.usccb.org/comm/
cip.htm (providing statistics about number of Catholics, parishes and priests
nationwide).
29. See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 4, at 34 (explaining that clergy sexual
abuse is not unique to any one denomination). Multiple religious denominations
have faced allegations of clergy sexual abuse. See id. (explaining that Roman Catholic Church is not only institutional church that has experienced problem of
clergy sexual abuse).
Since 1991, at least four rabbis of major congregations have lost their
positions due to claims of sexual relations with congregation members.
Buddhist teachers have been accused of exploiting women at Zen communities in the United States. The United Methodist Church reported in
a 1990 survey that nearly 23 percent of the laywomen had been sexually
harassed, 17 percent by their own pastor and 9 percent by another minister. In a survey of evangelical ministers, 23 percent admitted to engaging
in sexually inappropriate conduct ....
Id. In addition to affecting multiple denominations, clergy sexual abuse has impacted countries outside the United States. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at
551 (describing clergy sexual abuse in other countries).
30. 127 A. 340, 341 (N.J. 1925) (holding that charitable hospital is immune
from tort liability); see also Bottari, supranote 19, at 61-62 (tracing historical development of charitable immunity).
31. See D'Amato, 127 A. at 340 (stating facts and issues of case). Plaintiff suffered injuries during her hospital stay when she fell during a transfer from a wheelchair to a hospital bed. See id. (describing injury).
32. See id. at 341 (examining case law from New York, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts). Specifically, the court relied on Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (holding that hospital is not liable for negligence
of employees), Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 75 A. 1087, 1088 (Pa. 1910) (holding
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in favor of charitable immunity. 33 Without elaboration beyond a summary
of the three cases, the court concluded "public policy requires that a charitable institution maintaining a hospital be held not liable for injuries resulting to patients through negligence or carelessness of its physicians and
nurses." 34 The court did not, however, identify the specific public policy
objective it believed charitable immunity advances. 3 5 Regardless, the
court's decision effectively introduced immunity to charitable organiza36
tions within the state.

that public charity is not liable for its servants' torts) and McDonald v. Massachusetts
General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 436 (1876) (holding that hospital is not liable for
negligence of employees). See id. (highlighting existing case law). In Schloendorff
plaintiff was injured during an unauthorized operation. See Schloendorff, 105 N.E.
at 93 (stating facts). As a result of the surgery, plaintiff developed gangrene and
"some of her fingers had to be amputated." See id. (same). The court applied the
doctrine of charitable immunity and held that the hospital was not liable. See id. at
95 (discussing holding). Plaintiff in Gable was also staying in a hospital. See Gable,
75 A. at 1088 (stating facts). In order to warm plaintiffs hospital bed, nurses
placed bottles of hot water in it. See id. (same). After one nurse rearranged the
bottles around plaintiff's body, hot water leaked and scalded plaintiff, who was
"unconscious and helpless in the bed." See id. (same). The court applied the doctrine of charitable immunity and did not hold the hospital liable. See id. (discussing holding and rationale). Plaintiff in McDonald fractured his leg. See McDonald,
120 Mass. at 434 (stating facts). He alleged that agents of defendant hospital "negligently and unskillfully" treated him, thereby causing permanent injuries. See id.
(same). The court applied charitable immunity and held that the hospital was not
liable for plaintiffs injuries. See id. at 436 (discussing holding and rationale).
33. See D'Amato, 127 A. at 341 (summarizing holdings in Schloendorff Gable and
McDonald); see also McDonald, 120 Mass. at 436 (stating holding); Schloendorff, 105
N.E. at 93 (same); Gable, 75 A. at 1088 (same). The Schloendorff court summed up
its reasoning by explaining, "[a] hospital opens its doors without discrimination to
all who seek its aid .... In this beneficent work, it does not subject itself to liability
for damages though the ministers of healing whom it has selected have proved
unfaithful to their trust." Schloendorff 105 N.E. at 95.
34. D'Amato, 127 A. at 341 (explaining court's rationale).
35. See Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 141 A.2d 276, 280 (N.J. 1958)
(remarking that "the Chancellor did not document his expression of public policy,
nor did he discuss the underlying reasons for the court's conclusion that it should
then declare the immunity").
36. See Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 472 A.2d 531, 540 (N.J. 1984)
(identifying D'Amato as "first authoritative pronouncement of the charitable immunity doctrine in [New Jersey]"); see also Bottari, supra note 19, at 64 ("Judicial affirmance for this common law doctrine has been frequent."); see, e.g., Casper v.
Cooper Hosp., 98 A.2d 605, 606 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953) (applying doctrine of charitable immunity in reliance on D'Amato); Woods v. Overlook Hosp.
Ass'n, 69 A.2d 742, 749-50 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1949) (applying D'Amato
despite recognition that charitable immunity doctrine is widely criticized); Boeckel
v. Orange Mem'l Hosp., 158 A. 832, 833 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1932) (applying doctrine of
charitable immunity in reliance on D'Amato). But cf Kolb v. Monmouth Mem'l
Hosp., 182 A. 822, 823 (N.J. 1936) (declining to afford hospital charitable immunity on basis that plaintiff was not beneficiary of hospital's charitable works).
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Abolishment of Common Law Doctrine

Following a judicial decision that recognized a qualification on charitable immunity,37 a trilogy of cases decided in 1958 abolished the common law doctrine in New Jersey. 38 The court rejected immunity in a
negligence action against a nonprofit charitable hospital facility in Collopy
v. Newark Eye and EarInfirmary.3 9 The court extended its holding in Colopy
to all charitable institutions, regardless of the particular charitable aim, in
Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church.40 In doing so, the court silenced arguments that the Collopy holding "should be limited so as to exclude
churches and similar charitable immunities." 41 Finally, the court reaffirmed its position by holding that charitable immunity was unavailable to
42
the Y.M.C.A. in Benton v. Y.M.C.A.
In Collopy, the court rationalized its holding by exploring several
problems with charitable immunity. 43 First, the court emphasized that the
English decision that established the doctrine of charitable immunity was
37. SeeJewell v. St. Peter's Parish, 76 A.2d 917, 918-19 (Hudson County Ct.
1950) (holding that charitable immunity is unavailable where activity is unconnected to church's primary function). Plaintiff in Jewell attended a festival on defendant church's property. See id. at 918 (stating facts). While there, plaintiff fell
on a stairway. See id. (same). She alleged that the defendant's negligence caused
"the faulty condition of the stairway." See id. (stating plaintiff's cause of action).
Defendant church argued that it was immune from tort liability arising out of its
servants' negligence. See id. (noting defendant's reliance on charitable immunity).
The court rejected defendant's argument because "what attracted plaintiff to defendant's building and there engaged her [was] essentially unrelated to defendant's institutional life and work." See id. at 919 (discussing qualification on
charitable immunity). That is,the activity was strictly secular rather than ecclesiastical. See id. (explaining reason for qualification).
38. See Benton v. Y.M.C.A., 141 A.2d 298, 299 (NJ. 1958) (refusing to apply
doctrine of charitable immunity); Collopy, 141 A.2d at 276 (same); Dalton v. St.
Luke's Catholic Church, 141 A.2d 273, 274 (NJ. 1958) (same).
39. See Collopy, 141 A.2d at 287 (stating holding). In Collopy, the plaintiff suffered injuries after falling out of a hospital bed. See id. at 277 (stating facts). The
bed did not have "suitable guardrailing." See id. (same). After the fall, defendant
hospital released plaintiff without informing him that he had sustained injuries.
See id. (same). The court did not accept the hospital's argument that charitable
immunity precluded liability for hospital negligence. See id. at 287 (discussing
court's reasoning).
40. See 141 A.2d 273, 274 (N.J. 1958) ("The New Jersey cases which applied
either the immunity or the exception thereto recognized no distinction which
turned on the issue of whether the particular charity catered primarily to the wellbeing of the body, the mind or the spirit. .. ."); see also Bottari, supra note 19, at 65
(discussing extension of Collopy holding in Dalton).
41. Dalton, 141 A.2d at 274 (explaining that there is "no basis" for limiting
holding in Collopy to hospitals at exclusion of "churches and similar charitable
institutions").
42. See Benton, 141 A.2d at 299 (holding that charitable immunity does not
apply to organization).
43. See Collopy, 141 A.2d at 278-83 (explaining rationale for holding). But see
D'Amato v. Orange Mem'l Hosp., 127 A. 340, 341 (N.J. 1925) (justifying charitable
immunity on public policy grounds).
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45
later overruled. 4 4 Dicta by Lord Cottenham in Duncan v. Findlater and
46
Feoffees of Heriot'sHospital v. Ross provided the basis for charitable immunity in England. 4 7 Adhering to this dicta, the court held in Holliday v. St.
Leonard, Shoreditch4 8 that the vestry of a parish was immune from tort liabil-

ity. 4 9 Nevertheless, charitable immunity was short-lived. 5 0 Five years later,

the court rejected Lord Cottenham's dicta in Mersey Docks Trustees v.
51
In 1871, the court reversed Holliday in Foreman v. Mayor of CanterGibbs.
52
Subsequent English cases followed both Mersey Docks and Foreman
bury.
53
and refused to recognize charitable immunity.
Mindful of the changes in English law, the NewJersey Supreme Court
in Collopy criticized the adoption of charitable immunity in the United
States. 5 4 Massachusetts was the first state to adopt the doctrine in McDon55
The McDonald court mistakenly apald v. Massachusetts General Hospital
plied Holliday, which had since been overruled, and held that a charitable
44. See Collopy, 141 A.2d at 278 (discussing tenuous basis of charitable immunity in light of English common law); see also Bottari, supra note 19, at 61-62
(chronicling development of charitable immunity in England and its subsequent
abolishment).
45. 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (H.L. 1839) (holding that trustees are not liable for negligence of persons who are not trustees' servants).
46. 8 Eng. Rep. 1508, 1510 (H.L. 1846) (refusing to award damages out of
trust fund because doing so would divert funds from original purpose). "To give
damages out of trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects whom the
author of the fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely different
purpose." Id.
47. See Collopy, 141 A.2d at 278 (explaining way in which English court came
to recognize charitable immunity). See generally Brown v. Anderson County Hosp.
Ass'n, 234 S.E.2d 873, 875 (S.C. 1977) (describing development of charitable immunity act in England); Bottari, supranote 19, at 61-62 (discussing basis for charitable immunity).
48. 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861).
49. Id. (denying recovery against parish for injury resulting from highway
defect).
50. See Collopy, 141 A.2d at 278 (remarking that court quickly overturned
holding in Holliday).
51. 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866) (rejecting principle of charitable immunity expressed in Holliday); see also Brown, 234 S.E.2d at 875 (discussing demise of charitable immunity in English common law).
52. 6 Q.B. 214 (1871); see also Brown, 234 S.E.2d at 875 (discussing abolishment of charitable immunity in English common law).
53. See, e.g., Hillyer v. Governors of St. Bartholomew's Hosp., 2 KB. 820, 825
(Eng. C.A. 1909) (refusing to apply charitable immunity).
54. See Collopy, 141 A.2d at 278 (explaining that McDonald introduced charitable immunity to United States "rel[ying] entirely on the Holliday case without recognizing that it had already been overruled"). For a discussion of McDonald, see
infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
55. 120 Mass. 432, 436 (1876) (adopting charitable immunity doctrine); see
also Collopy, 141 A.2d at 278 (noting that American courts first considered issue of
charitable immunity in McDonald); Bottari, supra note 19, at 62 (stating that "Massachusetts court applied the Holliday result in a case of first impression in this
country").
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hospital is immune from tort liability. 56 Other states followed suit and
adopted charitable immunity. 57 The courts' misplaced reliance on Holliday was not revealed until 1942, when Justice Rutledge delivered his opinion in President of Georgetown College v. Hughes.58 This opinion exposed the
"historical error" courts committed by relying on Holliday.59 Following
this revelation, state courts, which had previously adopted charitable immunity in reliance on McDonald, began rejecting the doctrine.6 "
56. See McDonald, 120 Mass. at 436 (adopting charitable immunity doctrine);
see also Jennifer S. Anderson, Comment, All True Histories Contain Instruction: Why
HMOs Cannot Avoid Malpractice Liability Through Independent Contractingwith Physicians, 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 323, 331 (1998) ("Charitable immunity, as applied in
the United States, was based on ajurisprudential mistake.");John R. Feather, Comment, The Immunity of CharitableInstitutionsfrom Tort Liability, 11 BAYLOR L. REv. 86,
88-89 (1959) (describing McDonald court's application of Holliday as "error"). The
McDonald court summarized the holding in Holliday.
Where actions have been brought against commissioners of public works
serving gratuitously, for negligence in carrying on the work, by which injury has occurred, it has been held that they were not liable if proper care
had been used by them in selecting those who were actually to perform
the work.
Anderson, supra, at 331. The court then expressly adopted this holding as law. See
id. (stating that liability cannot extend beyond that discussed in Holliday).
57. See Collopy, 141 A.2d at 278 (noting state courts' adherence to decision in
McDonald); see, e.g.,
Downes v. Harper Hosp., 60 N.W. 42, 43 (Mich. 1894) (adopting charitable immunity and citing McDonald in support of decision); Perry v.
House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20, 26-28 (Md. 1885) (adopting charitable immunity in
reliance on McDonald and English common law).
58. 130 F.2d 810, 815-16 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (describing adoption of charitable
immunity in United States as "accidental"); see also Collopy, 141 A.2d at 278 (discussing impact of Justice Rutledge's opinion in Hughes); Bottari, supra note 19, at 62
(explaining significance of Justice Rutledge's opinion).
59. See Bottari, supra note 19, at 62 (recounting development and subsequent
demise of charitable immunity). In his opinion, Justice Rutledge criticized the
adoption of charitable immunity. See Hughes, 130 F.2d at 816 (exposing error
courts made in relying on English common law). He stated:
Massachusetts adopted the repudiated rule of [Holliday] in [McDonald]
and Maryland followed [The Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross] in Perry v.
House of Refuge. Apparently both courts acted in ignorance of the English
reversal. In any event, they resurrected in America a rule already dead in
England, and thereby gave Lord Cottenham's dictum a new lease on life
in the New World.
Id. (citation omitted).
60. See, e.g., Ray v. Tucson Med. Ctr., 230 P.2d 220, 229 (Ariz. 1951) (rejecting
charitable immunity); St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n v. Long, 240 P.2d 917, 920 (Colo.
1952) (holding that charities are not immune from tort liability though their trust
funds are protected); Durney v. St. Francis Hosp., 83 A.2d 753, 758 (Del. Super. Ct.
1951) (rejecting charitable immunity); Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints
Hosp., 297 P.2d 1041, 1042 (Idaho 1956) (same); Haynes v. Presbyterian Hosp.
Ass'n, 45 N.W.2d 151, 154 (Iowa 1950) (same); Noel v. Menninger Found., 267
P.2d 934, 938 (Kan. 1954) (same); Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957)
(same); Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hosp., 23 N.W.2d 247, 257 (N.D. 1946)
(same); Albritton v. Neighborhood Ctrs. Ass'n for Child Dev., 466 N.E.2d 867, 871
(Ohio 1984) (same); Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 70 A.2d 230, 237 (Vt.
1950) (same); Pierce v. Yakima Valley Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 260 P.2d 765, 775
(Wash. 1953) (same); see also Bottari, supra note 19, at 62-63 (explaining that re-
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Next, the New Jersey Supreme Court critically evaluated the court's
reasoning in D'Amato.6 1 As discussed above, D'Amato relied on three state
court decisions from New York, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. 62 One of
these decisions was McDonald, which relied on the previously overruled
decision in Holliday.63 Another decision cited in D'Amato, Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital,64 was overturned prior to Collopy.6 5 After noting the weak precedent used by the D'Amato court, the Colkopy court further criticized D'Amato on the grounds that the "public policy"justification
66
was not sufficiently supported.
Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court supported its decision in Collopy by identifying changes in society's mores. 67 The court recognized that
at the time the court decided DAmato, public policy may have supported
jection of doctrine stemmed from both revelation of "historical error" and "evolving public needs").
61. See Collopy, 141 A.2d at 280 (pointing out that D'Amato relied on problematic precedent and did not fully explain how "public policy" justified its holding).
62. See D'Amato v. Orange Mem'l Hosp., 127 A. 340, 341 (N.J. 1925) (summarizing Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914), Gable v.
Sisters of St. Francis, 75 A. 1087 (Pa. 1910) and McDonald v. Massachusetts General
Hospital 120 Mass. 432 (1876)).
63. See id. (citing and relying on McDonald). For a discussion of McDonaldand
its reliance on Holliday, see supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
64. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
65. See Collopy, 141 A.2d at 280 (explaining that Schloendorffwas overruled in
1957 by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957)). In Bing, the court rejected
charitable immunity for hospitals. See Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 8-9 (reasoning that
"hospitals should ... shoulder the responsibilities borne by everyone else"). The
court explained that hospital exemption from respondeat superior should cease.
See id. at 8 (noting "[l]iability is the rule, immunity the exception"). Furthermore,
the court expressed its opinion that charitable immunity no longer served society's
interests. See id. at 9 (explaining reason for abolishing charitable immunity). It
stated, "[t]he rule of nonliability is out of tune with the life about us, at variance
with modem-day needs and with concepts ofjustice and fair dealing. It should be
discarded." Id.
66. See Collopy, 141 A.2d at 280 (commenting on lack of documentation for
Chancellor's "expression of public policy"). "[T]he only ground advanced in
D'Amato in support of its holding" was flawed. See id. (criticizing reasoning in
D'Amato). "[T]he Chancellor did not document his expression of public policy,
nor did he discuss the underlying reasons for the court's conclusion that it should
then declare the immunity." Id.
67. See id. at 282 ("It may perhaps be that when D'Amato was rendered in 1925
it accurately represented the then prevailing notions of public policy. But times
and circumstances have changed and we do not believe that it faithfully represents
current notions of rightness and fairness."); see also President of Georgetown Coll.
v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ("Changes in the law and in the
organization and mores of community life have taken away [the] major force [of
the chief arguments for sustaining charitable immunity]."). Fostering the development of charitable organizations and encouraging donations were the public policy reasons offered in support of charitable immunity. See Feather, supra note 56,
at 93-94 (discussing evolution of public policy justification for charitable immunity). After charitable organizations became more entrenched in American society, however, public policy concerns shifted to concern for individuals. See id. at
94. "Immunity inclines a person to carelessness and disregard for the rights of
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charitable immunity. 6 8 The court explained that public policy had since
changed, placing greater emphasis on general principles of fairness and
due care by all. 6 9 Increased availability of insurance further impacted the
court's determination by providing reassurance that charitable funds
would

not diminish completely

abolishment.
3.

70

as a result of charitable

immunity's

Legislative Response

In response to the New Jersey Supreme Court's abolishment of charitable immunity, the NewJersey legislature immediately reinstated the docothers, while liability inclines a person to care and dutiful consideration for the
safety of others." Id.
68. See Collopy, 141 A.2d at 282 (acknowledging that D'Amato may have represented prevailing public policy notions at time of decision). But see Lester W.
Feezer, The Tort Liability of Charities, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 191, 193 (1928) (expressing
opinion that by 1928 "social concepts" had evolved to point where charitable immunity was no longer responsive to societal needs).
69. See Collopy, 141 A.2d at 282 (discussing evolution of society's conception of
public policy); see also Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 9 (commenting on modern perceptions
of justice and fairness).
70. See Collopy, 141 A.2d at 282 (citing Lokar v. Church of the Sacred Heart,
133 A.2d 12, 24 (N.J. 1957) (Wachenfeld,J., concurring)) (emphasizing that availability of insurance makes charitable immunity less important); see also Hughes, 130
F.2d at 828 (citing availability of insurance as one reason for rejection of charitable
immunity by District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 1942); Daniel A. Barfield,
Better to Give Than to Receive: Should Nonprofit Corporationsand Charities Pay Punitive
Damages?, 29 VAL. U. L. REv. 1193, 1195 (1995) (citing "development of... advanced insurance industry" as reason majority of jurisdictions "repudiated or substantially limited" charitable immunity); Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property
Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531, 548-49 (1998) ("The increasing size of
charities and their ability to obtain insurance has had an impact on the charitable
immunity doctrine... [it] has been forsaken due to changes in the world of insurance."). But cf.Schiltz, supra note 4, at 956-58 (discussing problems with liability
insurance for churches confronted with clergy sexual abuse litigation); Charles
Robert Tremper, Compensationfor Harm from CharitableActivity, 76 CORNELL L. REv.
401, 411 (1991) (expressing opinion that increased insurance costs have played
role in "charitable immunity counter-trend"). Victims often report clergy sexual
abuse a number of years after it occurs. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 956 (discussing
difficulty locating insurance policy held at time of abuse when victims do not report abuse until many years later).
When a church is sued for misconduct that occurred in 1960, it is unlikely that the church will be able to identify the company that insured it
at that time. Even if the church can identify the insurer, it likely cannot
prove the scope or limits of its coverage .. .when churches [do] locate
old insurance policies, they usually find that the limits of coverage are
grossly inadequate. A $10,000 liability policy provided ample protection
in 1960; it does not in 2003.
Id. Churches have also encountered difficulty because "for the past decade or so,
policies that insure churches have excluded coverage for liability arising out of
sexual misconduct." Id. at 956-57; see also O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 4, at
69-70 (explaining that some insurance companies "provid[e] lower coverage limits on sexual molestation claims than under the general liability coverage").
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275

trine. 7 1 The legislature included an expiration date of June 30, 1959 for
the law reinstating charitable immunity.7 2 On June 11, 1959, the expiration date became moot when the state governor signed the New Jersey
74
73
To date, this Act is still in place.
Charitable Immunity Act into law.
71. See Bottari, supra note 19, at 66 (stating that New Jersey legislature "resurrected" charitable immunity when it signed sections 16:1-48 to 53 of Revised Statutes into law on July 22, 1958). The language of this statute reviving charitable
immunity and the NewJersey Charitable Immunity Act enacted in 1959 were identical, with one exception-the first statute had an expiration date. See id. at 66
(explaining development of Charitable Immunity Act).
72. See id. (stating expiration date of statute). There are various explanations
for the expiration date. See id. (speculating about reasons legislature initially included expiration date for charitable immunity statute). One possibility is that the
legislature included an expiration date in case public opposition arose in response
to the statute. See id. (same). There has also been speculation that the legislature
intended the statute to provide charities with enough time to procure liability insurance. See id. (same).
73. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 2004) (establishing charitable immunity with no fixed expiration date).
74. See id. (reflecting current status of charitable immunity in New Jersey).
Although the Charitable Immunity Act is still in place, members of the legislature
have repeatedly proposed bills to amend the Act. In February 2000, New Jersey
state Senators Joseph F. Vitale and Louis C. Bassano introduced a bill to modify the
Charitable Immunity Act. See S.965, 209th Leg., 2000-01 Sess. (N.J. 2000) (attempting to modify Charitable Immunity Act to give minor victims of sexual abuse
redress against charitable organizations). It stated:
The immunity from civil liability granted to a nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable, educational or hospital purposes pursuant to the provisions of [the NewJersey
Charitable Immunity Act] shall not apply in any civil action which alleges
that the negligent hiring or supervision of any employee resulted in a
sexual offense being committed against a person under the age of 18 who
was a beneficiary of the nonprofit organization. As used in this section,
"sexual offense" means any crime defined in chapter 14 of Title 2C of the
New Jersey Statutes.
Id. The Vitale/Bassano bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, but
did not advance further. See NEW JERSEY LEGISLATURE, Bills 2000-2001, at http://
www.njeg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2004) (providing bill's
history). In January 2002, Vitale introduced a bill identical to the 2000 Vitale/
Bassano bill. See S.843, 210th Leg., 2002-03 Sess. (N.J. 2002) (proposing amendment to eliminate charitable immunity where minors are sexually abused by employees of immune organizations). Like its predecessor, the 2002 Vitale bill was
referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee but did not advance further. See NEW
JERSEY LEGISLATURE, Bills 2002-2003 [hereinafter Bills 2002-2003], at http://www.
njeg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2004) (providing bill's history). During the same legislative session, four additional state senators proposed
a similar bill to amend the Charitable Immunity Act. See S. 1421, 210th Leg.,
2002-03 Sess. (N.J. 2002) (proposing additional language for Charitable Immunity
Act). That bill proposed adding the following language to the Act:
2. d. Nothing in [the Act] shall be deemed to grant immunity to any
nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable, educational or hospital purposes for the negligent hiring or negligent supervision of any agent or servant of such corporation,
society or association which resulted in sexual abuse, sexual assault or
other crimes of a sexual nature committed against a person who was a
beneficiary of the corporation, society or association.
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The Charitable Immunity Act shields any "non profit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes" from tort liability arising from negligence. 75 The Act
3. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a nonprofit
corporation, society or association shall be liable for the negligent hiring
or negligent supervision of any agent or servant of such corporation, society or association which resulted in sexual abuse, sexual assault or other
crimes of a sexual nature committed against a person who was a beneficiary of the corporation, society or association.
Id. After its introduction in the state senate, the bill was referred to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, where it remained until the end of the legislative session. See
Bills 2002-2003, supra (providing bill's history). An identical bill introduced in the
state assembly suffered the same fate-after its referral to the Assembly Judiciary
Committee, it remained there for the duration of the legislative session. See A.
2141, 210th Leg., 2002-03 Sess. (NJ. 2002) (proposing identical amendment); see
also Bills 2002-2003, supra (providing bill's history). Although legislators again
proposed this amendment in 2004 in the state senate and assembly, it has not
advanced beyond referral to the respective judiciary committees. See S. 283, 211th
Leg., 2004-05 Sess. (NJ. 2004) (proposing identical amendment in Senate in
2004); A. 2109, 211th Leg., 2004-05 Sess. (N.J. 2004) (proposing identical amendment in Assembly in 2004); see also NEWJERSEY LEGISLATURE, Bills 2004-2005 [hereinafter Bills 2004-2005], at http://www.njeg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (last
visited Dec. 1, 2004) (providing bill's history). Another bill, proposed in January
2004 by Senator Vitale and Senator Nia H. Gill, has had greater success. See S. 540,
211th Leg., 2004-05 Sess. (NJ. 2004) (proposing modification of Charitable Immunity Act to permit lawsuits against charitable organizations that negligently hire
or supervise employees who sexually abuse minors); see also Bills 2004-2005, supra
(providing bill's history). The language of the 2004 Vitale/Gill bill is identical to
the 2000 Vitale/Bassano bill and the 2002 Vitale bill. Compare S. 540, 211th Leg.,
2004-05 Sess. (N.J. 2004), with S. 965, 209th Leg., 2000-01 Sess. (NJ. 2000), and S.
843, 210th Leg., 2002-03 Sess. (NJ. 2002); see also A. 2512, 211th Leg., 2004-05
Sess. (NJ. 2004) (proposing amendment in assembly identical to 2004 Vitale/Gill
senate bill). The proposed legislation would allow beneficiaries to sue charitable
organizations when the organizations negligently hire or supervise employees who
sexually abuse minors. Vitale Statement, supra note 22 (explaining purpose of
Vitale/Gill bill). In his statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Vitale explained that "'[t]he Charitable Immunity Act'was originally designed to remove
the threat of lawsuits to charitable organizations by beneficiaries of that organization ....

However, with the increased prevalence of sex-abuse cases coming to

light, charitable immunity edicts across the country have been coming under
closer scrutiny than ever before." NEws FROM NJ. SENATE DEMOCRATS, Charitable
Immunity Testimony (Jan. 26, 2004), at http://www.njsendems.com/Releases/04/
January/Vitale % 20% Charitable % 20% Immunity% 20 %Testimony% 20 % 01-26-04.
htm (transcribing testimony of Senator Vitale at Senate Judiciary Committee meeting). Unlike identical bills in previous legislative sessions, the Senate passed the
2004 Vitale/Gill bill. See Bills 2004-2005, supra (providing bill's history). The bill
then moved to the assembly, where the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee considered it. See id. (posting steps bill has taken during 2004
legislative session). On November 8, 2004, the bill was reported out of the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee. See id. (same). To date, the
assembly as a whole has not voted on the Vitale/Gill bill. See id. (same).
75. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7. The statute states in pertinent part:
a. No nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively
for religious, charitable or educational purposes or its trustees, directors,
officers, employees, agents, servants or volunteers shall, except as is hereinafter set forth, be liable to respond in damages to any person who shall
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distinguishes between beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries of charitable
works-charitable immunity applies only where the beneficiary suffers injury. 76 It represents a minority position among United States
77
jurisdictions.
suffer damage from the negligence of any agent or servant of such corporation, society or association, where such person is a beneficiary, to
whatever degree, of the works of such nonprofit corporation, society or
association; provided, however, that such immunity from liability shall
not extend to any person who shall suffer damage from the negligence of
such corporation, society, or association or of its agents or servants where
such person is one unconcerned in and unrelated to and outside of the
benefactions of such corporation, society or association ....
c. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to grant immunity to: (1) any
trustee, director, officer, employee, agent, servant or volunteer causing
damage by a willful, wanton or grossly negligent act of commission or
omission, including sexual assault and other crimes of a sexual nature
Id. While individuals affiliated with charitable organizations are not immune from
liability resulting from gross negligence, the organization does retain immunity
where its employees have committed grossly negligent acts. For a discussion of the
distinction between the immunity afforded to individuals affiliated with charitable
organizations and the organizations themselves, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
76. See id. (establishing beneficiary/nonbeneficiary distinction for charitable
immunity in tort actions arising out of negligence). "[I]mmunity from liability
shall not extend to any person who shall suffer damage from the negligence of
such corporation, society, or association or of its agents or servants where such person
is one unconcerned in and unrelated to and outside of the benefactions of such corpora-

tion, society or association." Id. (emphasis added). In evaluating whether a plaintiff is a beneficiary for the purposes of the Charitable Immunity Act, the court must
consider "whether the institution pleading the immunity, at the time in question
was engaged in the performance of the charitable objectives it was organized to
advance." Anasiewicz v. Sacred Heart Church, 181 A.2d 787, 790 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1962); see also Rupp v. Brookdale Baptist Church, 577 A.2d 188, 191 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (adhering to beneficiary status test established by
Anasiewicz).

77. See RESTATEMENT TORTS, supra note 4, § 895E cmt. d (noting that majority
of states do not recognize charitable immunity); JERRY PHILLIPS ET AL., TORT LAw:
CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 797 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that "substantial majority"
of jurisdictions abolished charitable immunity); Gary Jones, The Requirement That
Private Hospitals Provide Emergency Care to Indigents as Eminent Domain, 20 J. LEGIS.
179, 185 (1994) (remarking that charitable immunity is not majority rule);
O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 4, at 60 (stating that majority of states abolished
charitable immunity either in part or in whole); Julie Johnson, Comment, The
Sanctuary Crumbles: The Future of Clergy Malpracticein Michigan, 74 U. DET. MERCY L.
REv. 493, 505 (1997) (stating that majority of states abolished charitable immunity); see, e.g., Ray v. Tuscon Med. Ctr., 230 P.2d 220, 229-30 (Ariz. 1951) (abrogating charitable immunity in Arizona); Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d
441, 448 (Cal. 1963) (abrogating charitable immunity in California); Talbot v. Waterbury Hosp. Corp., 164 A.2d 162 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1960) (abrogating charitable
immunity in Connecticut); Durney v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 83 A.2d 753, 758 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1951) (abrogating charitable immunity in Delaware); Haynes v. Presbyterian Hosp. Ass'n, 45 N.W.2d 151, 154 (Iowa 1950) (abrogating charitable immunity in Iowa); Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9 (N.Y. 1957) (abolishing charitable
immunity in New York); Albritton v. Neighborhood Ctrs. Ass'n for Child Dev., 466

N.E.2d 867, 871 (Ohio 1984) (abolishing charitable immunity in Ohio); Kojis v.
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Applying the CharitableImmunity Act to the Catholic Church Sexual Abuse
Scandal
In Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, decided two decades after the

enactment of the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act, the New Jersey SuI-

preme Court insulated the church from liability in a negligent hiring action resulting from clergy sexual abuse. 78 The victim was a prepubescent
male who attended a school owned by the archdiocese and participated in
a parish-sponsored Boy Scout troop. 79 A Franciscan brother, Robert

Coakley, served as both a teacher in the school and scoutmaster for the
troop. 80 While at Boy Scout camp, Coakley allegedly forced the victim to

participate in "sexual contact."8 l Coakley allegedly continued this behavior when school resumed. 82 Despite the fact that Coakley threatened the
victim not to report the abuse, the victim informed his parents of the situation.8 3 Ultimately, despite medical and psychological care, the victim
committed suicide. 84 In response, his parents brought a negligent hiring
action against the archdiocese. 85 The court held that the defense of charitable immunity was available to charities, including the church, sued by
86
their beneficiaries under the theory of negligent hiring.
Doctors Hosp., 107 N.W.2d 131, 134 (Wis. 1961) (abrogating charitable immunity
in Wisconsin); cf MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 84k (West 2004) (imposing
$20,000 cap on tort judgments against charitable organizations in Massachusetts).
78. See Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 472 A.2d 531, 536 (N.J. 1984)
(determining that NewJersey Charitable Immunity Act precludes liability for charity under theory of negligence); see also Schiltz, supra note 4, at 959 ("Most often,
plaintiffs argue that it was negligent for the church to ordain, hire, or retain a
pastor after it knew, or should have known, something about the pastor that disqualified him from ministry."). Successful negligent hiring actions "depend... on
the existence of antecedent knowledge in the possession of religious superiors who
were in a position to act on the knowledge so as to. have prevented the sexual
misconduct from occurring." Chopko, supra note 4, at 1114. In Schultz, however,
any "antecedent knowledge" of archdiocese superiors was inconsequential because
the Charitable Immunity Act immunizes charitable institutions from tort liability
arising out of negligence. See Schultz, 472 A.2d at 539 (holding that Charitable
Immunity Act applies to archdiocese). For a discussion of the legislative history of
the Charitable Immunity Act, see infra notes 123-34 and accompanying text.
79. See Schultz, 472 A.2d at 532 (stating facts of case).
80. See id. (same).
81. See id. (same).
82. See id. (same).
83. See id. (same).
84. See id. (same).
85. See id. (explaining how case was initiated).
86. See id. at 538-39 (stating holding in Schultz). Schultz had important implications for the church because many victims of clergy sexual abuse bring actions
against the church under the theory of negligent hiring. SeeJohn H. Arnold, Clergy
Sexual Malpractice,8 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 25, 42 (1996) (discussing predominance of negligent hiring actions); Chopko, supra note 4, at 1114 (noting that
negligent hiring, retention and supervision claims are "far more likely" than other
claims). NewJersey first recognized the tort of negligent hiring in DiCosala v. Kay,
450 A.2d 508, 515 (N.J. 1982) (explaining that negligent hiring "addresses the risk
created by exposing members of the public to a potentially dangerous individual"),
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Schultz reflects the conflict between morality and the duty to uphold
the law. 87 The court admitted that its "natural sympathies favor [finding
an exception to charitable immunity]."88 Nevertheless, the court was obligated to give effect to the legislature's intent-liberal interpretation of the
statute. 89 Despite this obligation, the court offered the following thoughts
on the applicability of charitable immunity: "Perhaps the time has come
two years before the court decided Schultz. Despite the prevalence of negligent
hiring actions in clergy sexual abuse litigation against the church, some scholars
have raised First Amendment concerns about this cause of action. See Chopko,
supra note 4, at 1115 (noting that negligent hiring actions may involve judicial
inquiry into religious beliefs); see also O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 4, at 43 (raising constitutional question of "[h]ow deeply into the incardination process and
the canonical suspension power... a federal or state judge [can] immerse herself,
before the constitutional line is crossed?").
Negligent hiring actions are not the only theories victims of clergy sexual
abuse may pursue in an action against the church. See Chopko, supra note 4, at
1111-24 (discussing various theories of liability). Vicarious liability is one possibility. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 958 (discussing priests' role as "agents of diocese").
But cf Chopko, supra note 4, at 1113-14 (noting that "overwhelming majority rule
[is] that religious organizations are not liable for sexual assaults committed by
those who minister for them under the doctrine of respondeat superior"). Negligent supervision, often discussed simultaneously with negligent hiring, is another
option for victims seeking to hold the church liable. See Arnold, supra, at 42-43
(describing relationship between negligent hiring and negligent supervision).
The question in negligent supervision actions is "whether religious leaders were in
possession of information which, if acted upon, could have prevented the harm
upon which the lawsuit is based." Chopko, supra note 4, at 1116.
A third possible theory of liability is breach of fiduciary duty. See Schiltz, supra
note 4, at 961 (explaining that use of this type of action is increasing); see, e.g.,
Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.2d 409, 429 (2d
Cir. 1999) (applying fiduciary duty theory). Much like negligent hiring and supervision, however, constitutional barriers may impede success. See Chopko, supra
note 4, at 1116-17 ("Of those courts that have reached the constitutional issue,
many have rejected fiduciary duty claims against churches on constitutional
grounds.").
87. See Schultz, 472 A.2d at 539 ("Others must reconcile the issues of moral
responsibility. As to legal responsibility, we find that the act charged here is negligence in hiring. Under New Jersey's Charitable Immunity Act a charity is not liable for negligence."); see also Harold P. Southerland, Sovereignty, Value Judgments,
and Choice of Law, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 451, 500 (2000) ("[N]one of [the New Jersey
Supreme Court justices] bothered to disguise their distaste for the policy reflected
in the [Charitable Immunity Act] or for the result which it compelled. But ...
[the] court saw itself as an instrument of state policy and bowed to the will of the
legislature.").
88. Schultz, 472 A.2d at 535 (expressing dilemma presented by case).
89. See id. at 539 (noting that court was not free to interpret statute in light of
common law because liberal construction is statutorily prescribed); see also
Monaghan v. Holy Trinity Church, 646 A.2d 1130, 1135 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1994) (stating that court should liberally construe Charitable Immunity Act). The
legislature expressed its intent that courts construe the Charitable Immunity Act
liberally. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-10 (West 2004). The statute states:
[The Charitable Immunity Act] shall be deemed to be remedial and shall
be liberally construed so as to afford immunity to the said corporations,
societies and associations from liability as provided herein in furtherance
of the public policy for the protection of nonprofit corporations, societies
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for the Legislature to consider again the scope of the law and its intended
application to new theories of liability." 90 Members of the New Jersey legislature recently heeded this advice and proposed legislation that would
abolish charitable immunity in NewJersey. 9 1
III.

JUSTIFICATIONS AND COUNTERARGUMENTS FOR CHARITABLE IMMUNITY

A. Justifications in General
Proponents of charitable immunity offer several justifications for the
doctrine. 9 2 There is no consensus about which rationale is, in fact, the
primary justification. 93 Absent such a consensus, charitable immunity has
94
become both "controversial" and "complex."
1.

Trust Fund Theory

The trust fund theory for charitable immunity is based on the idea
that charitable funds are held in trust and, as a result, the charity cannot
use the funds to pay tort liability judgments. 95 The theory emphasizes the
and associations organized for religious, charitable, educational or hospital purposes.
Id. (emphasis added).
90. Schultz, 472 A.2d at 539.
91. For a discussion of proposed amendments to the Charitable Immunity
Act, see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
92. See RESTATEMENT TORTS, supra note 4, § 895E cmt. c (listing justifications
for charitable immunity); see also Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 141 A.2d
276, 282 (N.J. 1958) (summarizing reasons to exempt charities from tort liability);
O'Reilly & Strasser, supranote 4, at 59-61 (discussing various justifications); Wells,
supra note 2, at 1213-18 (identifying rationales for charitable immunity); Feather,
supra note 56, at 89 (noting that jurisdictions rely on "several different theories" to
justify charitable immunity). See generally MarkJ. Garwin, Immunity in the Absence of
Charity: EMTALA and the Eleventh Amendment, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 2 (1998) (noting
that justifications of charitable immunity evolved over time, beginning with rationale that public trust funds cannot be diverted). Critics of the doctrine offer
counterarguments for each justification. See RESTATEMENT TORTS, supra note 4,
§ 895E cmt. c (discussing weaknesses of each justification); Wells, supra note 2, at
1214-17 (countering public policy, trust fund and assumption of risk argument);
see also President of Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 824 (D.C. Cir.
1942) (listing counterarguments to charitable immunity).
93. See RESTATEMENT TORTS, supra note 4, § 895E cmt. c (noting that there is

no agreement upon which one theory justifies charitable immunity); see also Wells,
supra note 2, at 1213 (remarking that courts rely on four differentjustifications for
charitable immunity: trust fund theory, assumption of risk/implied waiver, inapplicability of respondeat superior and public policy).
94. See Wells, supra note 2, at 1213 (explaining origin of confusion surrounding charitable immunity); see also Feather, supra note 56, at 94 ("As a result of an
abundance of doubtful theories and their variations, the law in regard to 'immunity' is generally in a state of confusion.").
95. See Wells, supra note 2, at 1215 (explaining rationale for trust fund theory). Courts have relied on Lord Cottenham's dicta in Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v.
Ross when advancing the trust fund theory in support of charitable immunity. See
Benjamin S. Birnbaum, Note, Torts-Liability of Charitable Institution for the Negligence of its Employees, 14 B.U. L. REv. 477, 478 (1934) (describing origin of trust
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inviolability of donor intent. 96 That is, payment of tort damages from
charitable funds "would be to divert funds from the purpose intended by
97
the author of the trust."
98
First, tort
Critics point out several flaws in the trust fund theory.
claimants are not always precluded from reaching trust funds to satisfy tort
judgments. 99 Second, because donors' funds would not be exempt if they
continued to hold them as their own, donors cannot "confer immunity
10 0
Finally, the
upon [the funds]" simply by donating them to a charity.
trust fund theory cannot justify the immunization of charities where only
charitable beneficiaries are injured. 10 1

fund theory). In Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital, Lord Cottenham remarked, "[t]o give
damages out of a trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects whom the
author of the fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely different
purpose." Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508, 1510 (H.L.
1846).
96. See RESTATEMENT TORTS, supra note 4, § 895E cmt. c (explaining that charitable donations should not "be diverted from the purposes intended by their donors and applied to the payment of liabilities in tort"); Feezer, supra note 68, at
199 ("[T]he fund created by the benefactors of the charity would be diverted from
the purpose for which it was set apart [if the charity used the fund to pay tort
damages]."); see also Hughes, 130 F.2d at 822 (including concerns about upholding
donor intent among arguments in favor of charitable immunity); Feather, supra
note 56, at 89-90 (noting that donor intent/trust fund theory are based on English common law decisions).
97. Feather, supra note 56, at 89; see also RESTATEMENT TORTS, supra note 4,
§ 895E cmt. c (characterizing payment of damages resulting from tort liability as
diversion of donor intent).
98. See RESTATEMENT TORTS, supra note 4, § 895E cmt. c (discussing weaknesses of trust fund justification); Feezer, supra note 68, at 199-200 (same); Wells,
supra note 2, at 1215 (same); Feather, supra note 56, at 91-92 (same).
99. See RESTATEMENT TORTS, supra note 4, § 895E cmt. c (criticizing concept
that charitable funds are subject to impenetrable trust); see also Hughes, 130 F.2d at
823 (noting that trusts are no longer unreachable by tort claimants). "A person to
whom the trustee has incurred a liability in the course of the administration of the
trust can by a proceeding in equity reach trust property and apply it to the satisfaction of his claim under the circumstances stated in §§ 268-271 A." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)

OF TRUSTS § 267 (1959).

100. See RESTATEMENT TORTS, supra note 4, § 895E cmt. c (describing inability
of donors to make their assets immune); cf Wells, supranote 2, at 1215 (commenting on unlikely possibility that "every donor has stipulated that his or her gift cannot be used for liability costs").
101. See Feather, supra note 56, at 91 (explaining that trust fund theory only
justifies "complete immunity"); see also Feezer, supra note 68, at 199 (noting that
refusal to apply charitable immunity where nonbeneficiary is injured weakens trust
fund theory). The trust fund theory weakens when the beneficiary/stranger distinction is made for application of charitable immunity because it permits diversion of donor intent in some circumstances. See Feather, supra note 56, at 91
(illustrating that beneficiary/stranger distinction causes structure of trust fund theory to collapse). Where strangers (nonbeneficiaries) are injured, donor intent is
diverted because charities may use trust funds to pay judgments. See id. (same).
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Inapplicability of Vicarious Liability

The next rationale offered in support of charitable immunity is that
vicarious liability is inapplicable to charities because they receive no financial gain for services provided.' 0 2 Vicarious liability imposes strict liability
on employers for employees' torts committed while the latter are acting
within the scope of their employment.' 0 3 In the context of the clergy sexual abuse scandal, the church contends that sexual abuse of minors is
outside the scope of clerics' employment and is, therefore, insufficient
10 4
grounds for imposition of liability.
Generally speaking, the argument that vicarious liability does not apply absent a "gain" by the employer misinterprets the law. 10 5 Vicarious
liability depends on the employer-employee relationship rather than on
profitability. 10 6 Moreover, analyzing the rationale in the context of the
clergy sexual abuse scandal has led scholars to the conclusion that vicarious liability may, in fact, be appropriate. 10 7 First, within the hierarchy of
the Roman Catholic Church, "priests function as the agents of the dioceses."' 0 8 In addition, vicarious liability may be proper because "institu102. See

RESTATEMENT

TORTS, supra note 4, § 895E cmt. c (explaining that in-

applicability of vicarious liability is one rationale for charitable immunity); Wells,
supra note 2, at 1214 (same); Feather, supra note 56, at 90 (same).
103. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 136 (6th ed.
2003) (explaining vicarious liability); VANDALL, supra note 1, at 1041 (discussing
basic concept of vicarious liability). "The classic vicarious liability scenario involves
an employer being held liable for the negligent tort of an employee committed
while the employee was acting in the scope of his or her employment." Id.
104. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 958 (discussing church response to vicarious
liability claims arising out of clergy sexual abuse).
105. See RESTATEMENT TORTS, supra note 4, § 895E cmt. c (stating that theory
runs counter to the whole law of vicarious liability"); Feather, supranote 56, at 93
(noting that theory is founded on "faulty premise").
106. See RESTATEMENT TORTS, supra note 4, § 895E cmt. c (explaining that vicarious liability depends on "the employment of the servant, the employer's direction and control over his conduct and the furtherance of the enterprise that [the
employer] has set in motion"); Feather, supra note 56, at 93 (noting that employer's delegation of duties gives rise to respondeat superior).
107. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 958-59 (discussing principal-agent relationship that can give rise to vicarious liability). Vicarious liability can be imposed
under the theory of respondeat superior. See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 4, at
39 (explaining operation of respondeat superior in clergy sexual abuse actions
against church). Liability may arise if the employee commits a tort while acting
within the scope of his employment "or if other conditions of the principal-agent
relationship are satisfied." See id. (same). "A master or other principal may be
liable to another whose interests have been invaded by the tortious conduct of a
servant or other agent, although the principal does not personally violate a duty to
such other or authorize the conduct of the agent causing the invasion." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 216 (1958); see also Wells, supra note 2, at 1222 (concluding that exceptions exist to inapplicability of vicarious liability theory, which
relate to clergy sexual abuse).
108. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 958-59 (concluding that hierarchal structure
gives rise to principal-agent relationship between priests and dioceses).

The prin-

cipal-agent relationship can give rise to vicarious liability. See id. at 958 (noting
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tional negligence" has been a component of the clergy sexual abuse
scandal. 10 9 Scholars have concluded that the church's hierarchical and
internal discipline structures contributed to an institutional approach that
fueled the scandal.' 10
3.

Assumption of the Risk/"Implied Waiver" Theory

A third theory supporting charitable immunity advances the argument that beneficiaries of charities also assume the risk of the charity's
That is, one benefiting from charitable works "accepts
negligence.1 1
them as they are given" and "by implication agrees to 'waive' the liability
'1 12
Sustaining this arguand assert no claim in tort against his benefactor."
ment requires proof that the beneficiary waived tort claims both volunta113
Proof of these elements is
rily and with full knowledge of the risk.
difficult because recipients of charitable services have come to expect reasonable care. 114 When recipients submit to charitable organizations, they
that existence of principal-agent relationship is fiercely litigated). But cf John H.
Mansfield, ConstitutionalLimits on the Liability of Churchesfor Negligent Supervision and
Breach of FiduciaryDuty, 44 B.C. L. REv. 1167, 1171-72 (2003) (explaining that difficulty arises from characterizing church-priest relationship as principal-agent relationship because "the prohibition against answering religious questions forbids
looking to church law or structure to see if such a relationship exists").
109. See Wells, supra note 2, at 1222 (identifying three relevant factors, including institutional negligence, that impact vicarious liability analysis). When analyzing whether it is appropriate to impose vicarious liability on charitable
organizations, there are three relevant factors: (1) whether the charity charges for
its services and raises substantial funds; (2) the amount of damages sought by
plaintiff; and (3) whether "institutional negligence" is involved. See id. (enumerating factors). To determine whether there is "institutional negligence," "[t]he
question is whether the negligent conduct is really attributable to employees or
whether it represents the conscious policy of the institution." Id.
110. See Doyle & Rubino, supranote 8, at 615 (discussing impact of hierarchical structure on bishops' responses to clergy sexual abuse); Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries, 38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv.321, 321 (2003) (discussing impact
of church's preference for internal disciplining of abusive clergy). For a discussion
of the church's hierarchal and internal discipline structures and their impact on
the clergy sexual abuse scandal, see infra notes 149-89 and accompanying text.
111. See RESTATEMENT TORTS, supra note 4, § 895E cmt. c (discussing "waiver"
theory as justification for charitable immunity); Feezer, supra note 68, at 202 (noting that waiver theory gained prominence in 1901); Wells, supra note 2, at 1215-16
(describing assumption of risk rationale for charitable immunity); Feather, supra
note 56, at 90 (characterizing justification as "'implied waiver' theory" and noting
that it frequently arises in negligence actions against charitable hospitals). "The
substance of this theory is that by accepting the services of a charity, the beneficiary
impliedly waives liability or assumes the risk of the charity's negligent employees."
Feather, supra note 56, at 90.
112. RESTATEMENT TORTS, supra note 4, § 895E cmt. c (discussing assumption
of risk rationale).
113. See Wells, supra note 2, at 1216 (describing elements of assumption of
risk theory: voluntary and knowing waiver).
114. See RESTATEMENT TORTS, supra note 4, § 895E cmt. c ("The recipient in

fact understands and expects that he will be treated with reasonable care ....").
This theory is especially difficult to support when the plaintiff is not a beneficiary
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are not necessarily cognizant of the legal principles implicit in the waiver
' 116
theory.1 15 A waiver, then, "would be wholly fictitious."
4.

Public Policy

Finally, a general "public policy" justification seeks to ensure the continued viability of charitable enterprises.1 17 Proponents of charitable immunity contend that donations may decrease if donors know charities may
use their funds to pay tort claims. 118 A decrease in charitable funds may
have substantial impact on the services offered by a charity, thereby injuring the charitable beneficiaries as a whole. 1 19
of the charity's works. See Wells, supra note 2, at 1216 (illustrating flaw in the assumption of risk rationale). "It can hardly be supposed that one who is struck by a
charitable bloodmobile has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights."
Id. (noting illogical result where waiver theory is applied to nonbeneficiary).
115. See Feather, supra note 56, at 92 (discussing illogical results created by
waiver theory). Patients in charitable hospitals are illustrative of the difficulty encountered in sustaining the implied waiver theory: "[a] patient entirely unskilled
in legal principles, his body racked with pain, his mind distorted with fever, is held
to know, by intuition, the principle of law that courts after years of travail have at
last produced." Id. (quoting Lindler v. Columbia Hosp., 81 S.E. 512, 515 (S.C.
1914) (Fraser, J., dissenting)).
116. See Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 141 A.2d 276, 282 (N.J. 1958)
(criticizing argument that charitable beneficiaries waive all tort claims against charitable entities).
117. See RESTATEMENT TORTS, supra note 4, § 895E cmt. c (discussing public
policy objective of encouraging charitable entities); Feezer, supra note 68, at 206
(noting that public policy argument in favor of charitable immunity relies on notion that charities perform "quasi-governmental work by performing a function
which the government must otherwise undertake"); O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note
4, at 60 (explaining that public policy justification advocates encouragement of
"charitable endeavors" because charities provide benefits to society); Feather, supra
note 56, at 90-91 (describing public policy justification as "practical basis for all of
the [other] theoretical bases"). In Ettlinger v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 31
F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1929), the court summarized the public policy rationale:
A policy of the law which prevents [a charity's beneficiary] from suing it
for the torts of its agents and servants, and thus taking for [the beneficiary's] private use the funds which have been given for the benefit of humanity, which shields gifts made to charity from the hungry maw of
litigation and conserves them for purposes of the highest importance to
the state, carries on its face its own justification, and, without the aid of
metaphysical reasoning, commends itself to the wisdom of mankind.
Ettlinger,31 F.2d at 872.
118. See RESTATEMENT TORTS, supra note 4, § 895E cmt. c (discussing fear that
donations will be discouraged if charities can use them to pay tort judgments);
Birnbaum, supra note 95, at 478 (noting that courts were concerned judgment
awards against charities may discourage charitable donations); see also Schiltz, supra
note 4, at 964 ("The people in the pews do not seem anxious to increase their
donations to help pay the costs of litigation."); Wells, supranote 2, at 1215 (noting
that charitable immunity prevents defeat of donor intent and discouragement of
charitable gifts).
119. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 964-65 (explaining impact of litigation costs
on churches). "Because it is not realistic to expect donations to increase, churches
have no alternative but to pay for litigation by cutting back on the services they
provide." Id. at 964 (noting "cutting back" may range from disposing of invest-
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The consequence of this position is that the injured party must bear
the cost of a charity's liability. 120 The Restatement (Second) of Torts admonishes this result, emphasizing the public interest "in proper care and
treatment, and the compensation of harm done." 121 Another corollary to
the public policy rationale is that it forces a charitable contribution from
the victim.

12 2

B.

Justificationsfor New Jersey CharitableImmunity Act

1. Justification as Expressed by New Jersey Legislature
When enacting the Charitable Immunity Act, the New Jersey legisla123
The legislature focused on economic justifications for the doctrine.
ture emphasized the consequence of abolishing charitable immunitypossible depletion of charitable funds. 12 4 Accordingly, it structured the
Charitable Immunity Act "so that the organization's funds could be put to
better use in funding charitable works, instead of funding the cost of litigament property to closing schools and shelters to meet financial obligations of litigation expenses); see also Birnbaum, supra note 95, at 478 (noting that at inception
of public charities, courts agreed to shield them from tort liability in order to foster their development).
120. SeeWells, supra note 2, at 1214 ("We can free charities from liability costs
only by transferring them to injured parties.").
121. RESTATEMENT TORTS, supra note 4, § 895E cmt. c (providing justifications
for charitable immunity).
122. See Albritton v. Neighborhood Ctrs. Ass'n for Child Dev., 466 N.E.2d 867,
870-71 (Ohio 1984) (discussing problematic consequences of charitable
immunity).
[A] policy exempting a charitable organization from having to compensate for harm caused by it is equivalent to requiring an injured individual
to make an unwilling contribution to that organization in the amount of
the compensation which would be due him had he been injured by a
noncharitable entity. Such coerced donations are inimical to the whole
concept of charitable donation and service. They are, to say the least,
distinctly uncharitable.
Id. (describing charitable immunity as uncharitable); see also Wells, supra note 2,
1214-15 (exploring concept of "forced contribution"); Feather, supra note 56, at
86 (noting that, when plaintiffs cannot recover due to charitable immunity of defendant institution, they are effectively forced "to contribute to the maintenance of
[the] charitable institution").
123. See Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 472 A.2d 531, 537 (N.J.
1984) (citing Exemption of Religious, Charitable and Hospital Organizationsfrom Negligence Liability: Hearing on S. 204 Before the Assembly Judiciary Committee, 1958 Leg.,
188th Sess. (NJ. 1958)) (identifying economic concerns as focus of Charitable Immunity Act); Vitale Statement, supranote 22 (identifying original purpose of Charitable Immunity Act).
124. See Schultz, 472 A.2d at 537 (describing legislature's primary concerncontinued economic viability of charitable organizations-during consideration of
Charitable Immunity Act).
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tion against an organization."' 25 The legislature did not focus on the his12 6
torical inconsistencies in the doctrine that troubled the court in Collopy.

2.

Justification as Interpreted by the New Jersey Supreme Court

In O'Connell v. State,127 the NewJersey Supreme Court evaluated the
legislative history of the Charitable Immunity Act and offered its own interpretation of the legislature's intent.' 28 The court found "that preservation of a charity's assets was only one of a number of purposes propelling
29
The assumption of the
the [Charitable Immunity Act's] enactment."'
risk rationale was also influential in the legislature's decision.130 The inclusion of the "'beneficiary/stranger' distinction" in the Act led the court
to this conclusion. 3 1 First, use of the term "beneficiary" is associated with
the assumption of the risk justification. 132 Second, inclusion of the term
cannot be reconciled with the primary justification for the Act: preservation of charitable assets.' 3 3 As the court explained, "[t]he imposition of
tort liability has the potential to deplete a charitable fund regardless of
whether the judgment is paid to a beneficiary or a stranger."134
125. Vitale Statement, supra note 22 (stating rationale for substance of statutepreservation of charitable funds).
126. See Schultz, 472 A.2d at 537 (explaining that New Jersey legislature did
not strive for consistency with common law conception of charitable immunity
while drafting Charitable Immunity Act).
127. 795 A.2d 857 (N.J. 2002).
128. See id. at 859 (explaining that court's goal was to determine legislative
intent when interpreting statutes). In O'Connell, the court considered whether a
university was entitled to charitable immunity, despite its failure to pay judgments
from the funds of the educational institution. See id. at 858-59 (providing facts
and procedural posture of case).
129. Id. at 864 (interpreting legislative history to discern intent).
130. See id. (discussing evidence that waiver theory influenced New Jersey
legislature).
131. See id. (explaining that term "beneficiary" is associated with waiver theory); see also Wells, supra note 2, at 1222 ("[T]he distinction between suits by a
charitable beneficiary and suits by a stranger will not be relevant once we dismiss
the assumption of the risk rationale for charitable immunity.").
132. See O'Connell, 795 A.2d at 864-65 (discussing connection between use of
"beneficiary/stranger" distinction in Charitable Immunity Act and assumption of
risk rationale). The assumption of the risk rationale for charitable immunityjustifies the imposition of immunity where charitable beneficiaries are injured. See id.
(citing 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 29.16, 759-60 (2d ed.
1986)). The Charitable Immunity Act immunizes charities under these circumstances. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 2004) (immunizing charitable organizations against negligence claims by beneficiaries).
133. See O'Connell, 795 A.2d at 864 (noting that public policy justificationpreservation of charity's assets-cannot fully explain inclusion of beneficiary/
stranger distinction).
134. Id. (same).
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IV.

CHARITABLE IMMUNITY AND THE CATHOLIC CLERGY
SEXUAL ABUSE SCANDAL

Consideration of the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act in the context of the clergy sexual abuse scandal has sparked a movement for abolition of the doctrine in situations involving sexual abuse of minors. 1 35 The
unique character of the scandal may justify this response.' 3 6 First, clergy
sexual misconduct in the Catholic Church has produced more than occasional victims.' 3 7 Second, the church has played a direct role in enabling
clergy sexual abuse to reach epidemic proportions.' 3 8 Finally, the propensity of NewJersey's dioceses to settle clergy misconduct lawsuits has under-

135. For a discussion of proposed amendments to the Charitable Immunity
Act that would eliminate immunity where charities negligently hire or supervise
employees who sexually abuse minors, see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
136. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 555 (noting that church inefficiencies in addressing clergy sexual abuse has encouraged victims to seek relief from
civil court system). Clergy sexual abuse victims have expressed frustrations with
the response of church leadership to allegations of abuse. See id. (describing perceptions of post-1984 victims of clergy sexual abuse); O'Brien, supra note 2, at 373
(criticizing church's response to clergy sexual abuse scandal as unresponsive to
"horror visited upon the victims"). Victims are concerned that the church "mini-

mizes their claims" and that it responds to allegations with "[e]mpty assurances
that perpetrators would be properly dealt with." Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at
555.

137. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, The Nature and Scope of the
Problem of Sexual Abuse of Minors by Catholic Priests and Deacons in the United States: A
Research Study Conducted by the JohnJay College of CriminalJustice [hereinafter JohnJay
Study], at http://www.usccb.org/nrb/johnjaystudy (last visited Nov. 18, 2004)
(providing statistics that prove clergy sexual abuse of minors is widespread). For a
discussion of the number of victims and perpetrators in the clergy abuse scandal,
see infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
138. See Coughlin, supra note 2, at 977 (concluding that bishops' failure to
abide by canon law contributed to the current crisis);Janice Villiers, Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liabilityfor Sexual Misconduct in the CounselingRelationship, 74 DENY. U.
L. REv. 1, 19 (1996) (discussing church shortcomings that contributed to continuation of abuse, namely transferring abusive priests among parishes); Rod Dreher,
Catholic Hierarchy Responsible for Abusive Priests, PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.),
Jan. 23, 2002, at 13 (blaming church's "tepid response" to abuse scandal for victims' injuries and financial toll on church); see also Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8,
at 615 ("Sexual abuse committed by clergy members is not something isolated
from the dynamics of the Church's power structure."); Smith, supra note 2, at 412
(noting church hierarchy's "obsession" with protecting abusive priests); Michael
Paulson, Abuse Scandal Angers Conservative Catholics, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 27, 2002,
at Al (expressing conservative Catholics' opinion that church hierarchy is responsible for clergy sexual abuse scandal); U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS,
Charterfor the Protection of Children & Young People (2002) [hereinafter Charter], at
http://www.usccb.org/ocyp/charter.htm ("As bishops, we acknowledge our mistakes and our role in that suffering, and we apologize and take responsibility for
too often failing victims and our people in the past."). For a discussion of the
impact the church hierarchal structure and internal discipline had on clergy sexual abuse, see infra notes 149-89 and accompanying text.
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mined the Act's legislative intent-ensuring economic
1 39
charitable entities.
A.

prosperity of

Clergy Sexual Abuse Is Distinct from Occasional Injury

The clergy sexual abuse scandal has revealed the expansive character
of the problem, which scholars and bishops alike have characterized as a
crisis. 14 0 The Charitable Immunity Act values the benefit of charitable
works to society over the "occasional' victim.' 4 ' Statistical data, however,
calls into question whether victims of clergy sexual abuse are actually "occasional" victims.

14 2

Clergy sexual abuse of minors is "widespread."14 3 Results of a research study commissioned by the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops (UCCB) illustrate the problem's scope. 1 44 Out of one hundred
and ninety-five dioceses and eparchies participating in the study, all but
seven had received allegations that at least one of their priests had sexually
abused a minor. 145 Within American dioceses, victims have accused ap139. For a discussion of settlement agreements entered into by New Jersey's
five dioceses, see infra notes 204-18 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Coughlin, supra note 2, at 977 (characterizing clergy sexual
abuse as crisis); O'Brien, supra note 2, at 365 (describing clergy sexual abuse scandal as "the crisis within the American Catholic Church"); Charter, supra note 138
(stating in Preamble of Charter that "[t]he Church in the United States is experiencing a crisis without precedent in our times").
141. See Bottari, supra note 19, at 85 ("It is submitted that the far-reaching
benefits of bona fide charitable, educational, and religious organizations outweigh
the harm suffered by the occasionalplaintiff who has sustained an injury.") (emphasis added); see alsoJonathan Cardi, Note, Apportioning Responsibility to Immune Nonparties: An Argument Based on Comparative Responsibility and the ProposedRestatement
(Third) of Torts, 8 IOWA L. REv. 1293, 1321 (1997) ("The primary justification for
charitable immunity is that society's interest in maintaining charities outweighs the
interest in compensating the limited number of resulting tort victims."). The dictionary defines "occasional" as "encountered, occurring, appearing, or taken at
irregular or infrequent intervals." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
816 (9th ed. 1987).
142. See John Jay Study, supra note 137 (reporting that 10,667 individuals alleged clergy sexual abuse of minors between 1950 and 2002).
143. See O'Brien, supra note 2, at 365 (describing clergy sexual abuse as "so
widespread, so horrendous, and so clandestine"); John Jay Study, supra note 137
(providing statistics illustrating extent of clergy sexual abuse crisis). Eighty-one
percent of victims were male. See id. (describing offense characteristics). The largest group of victims were between ages eleven and fourteen. See id. (same). It was
not unusual for clergy sexual abuse to affect multiple children in a family. See id.
("Of those who alleged abuse... 17.2% of them had siblings who were also allegedly abused.").
144. See John Jay Study, supra note 137 (providing statistical data relating to
church clergy sexual abuse scandal). But see Schiltz, supra note 4, at 953 (expressing opinion that no studies provide reliable estimates). Other research studies,
however, report similar findings. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 86, at 26 (discussing
results of study conducted by Graduate Theological Union); Goodstein, supranote
2, at 1 (discussing results of New York Times survey).
145. See John Jay Study, supra note 137 (providing statistical data relating to
church clergy sexual abuse scandal).
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proximately four percent of Catholic priests and deacons of sexually abusing them while the victims were minors. 14 6 The study estimates that 4,392
priests and deacons have abused 10,667 minors between 1950 and
2002.147 The prevalent abuse evidenced by these statistics illustrates that
clergy sexual misconduct does not occur infrequently. 148

B.

InstitutionalRoots of Clergy Sexual Abuse

"Sexual abuse committed by clergy members is not something isolated from the dynamics of the church's power structure." 149 Both the
hierarchical structure and the preference for internal discipline have contributed to the church scandal. 150 An examination of each sheds light on
the choices bishops and dioceses made when responding to allegations of
15 1
clergy sexual abuse.
1.

HierarchicalStructure of Catholic Church

The church hierarchy is one of the main reasons church authorities
have faltered in effectively responding to allegations of clergy sexual

146. See id. (same).
147. See id. (same).
148. See id. (illustrating that clergy sexual abuse impacted large number of
dioceses and victims between 1950 and 2002).
149. Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 615 (explaining that actual sexual abuse
cannot be understood without considering church's structural influence); see also
McNamara, supra note 13, at BI (characterizing "official tolerance of pedophilia"
as "the most obvious sign to institutional dysfunction"); National Catholic Reporter, Church in Crisis: Interview of Dr. Leslie Lothstein by KatherineDiGiulio (June 17,
2002) [hereinafter Lothstein Interview], available at http://www.natcath.com/NCROnline/archives/081602/lothstein.htm (explaining that clergy sexual abuse "goes
right to the heart and system and structure of the church").
150. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 558, 587, 615 (discussing impact of
hierarchical structure on bishops' responses to clergy sexual abuse); Logan, supra
note 110, at 321, 330-36 (discussing impact of church's preference for internal
disciplining of abusive clergy). For a discussion of the church hierarchy's role in
the clergy sexual abuse scandal, see infra notes 152-73 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the church's internal discipline structure and its role in the
scandal, see infra notes 174-89 and accompanying text.
151. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 558, 587 (describing hierarchical
structure and bishops' responses to clergy sexual abuse); Logan, supra note 110, at
330-36 (discussing internal discipline and practice of shielding priests from civil
authorities).
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abuse. 152 In the church, individuals hold power. 153 The pope is the "supreme authority."1 54 Further down the hierarchy, the pope appoints bishops. 155 Bishops or archbishops control the "geographic division [s] of the
Church, known as diocese[s] or archdiocese[s].'1 5 6 Both the pope and
bishops enjoy a tremendous amount of power. 157 The pope "possesses
plenary power with respect to judicial, legislative, and executive functions
for the entire Catholic Church."1 58 Bishops possess the same powers in
59
each diocese, although they are under the pope's ultimate authority.'
The church hierarchy lacks "checks and balances," which increases
the potential for abuse of power.' 6 ° To defend this arrangement, church
officers rely on the proposition "It]hat the hierarchical government sys152. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 558 (identifying church governmental structure as predominant reason church did not adequately use canon law to
address clergy sexual abuse); see also Smith, supra note 2, at 409-10 (attributing
church's failure to address clergy sexual abuse to church institutions "designed to
protect priests"); Lothstein Interview, supranote 149 (blaming clergy sexual abuse on
church structure). The church hierarchy places a premium on protecting its
priests. See Smith, supra note 2, at 409-10 (noting that, though it is natural for
people to feel outrage toward pedophiles, church does not react with similar outrage when abuser is priest).
153. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 558. (classifying church structure as
.monarchical").
154. See id. (identifying pope's role in hierarchy).
155. See id. (describing manner by which bishops attain power in church
hierarchy).
156. See id. (identifying bishops' power base); see also Lothstein Interview, supra
note 149 (quoting National Review Board member, who characterized geographic
divisions as "fiefdoms" controlled by bishops).
157. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 558, 601-02 (explaining that both
pope and bishops enjoy nearly absolute power with minimal oversight).
158. Id.
159. See id. (contrasting pope's power to that of bishops). But cf.John H.
Garvey, The Pope's Submarine, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 849, 858-59 (1993) (noting that
there are some limits to hierarchal dominance).
[T]hough there is no denying the hierarchical structure of the Catholic
Church, it is a mistake to suppose that all teaching authority operates
from the top down. The Church's bishops are not by training or occupation its best informed members on questions of politics, science, social
science, or even theology. The laity are expected to make practical, prophetic, and scholarly contributions.
Id. (describing expectation of laity contribution to church).
160. See Garvey, supra note 159, at 858-59 (discussing problem with hierarchical structure); see also Lothstein Interview, supra note 149 (noting that those at top of
hierarchy, including bishops, "evoke a role of invincibility, invulnerability, omniscience and omnipotence"). Members of the National Review Board, formed by
the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops in response to the clergy abuse
scandal, learned much about the church hierarchy and its power dynamics. See
Jason Berry, Board Got Rare Look at HierarchicalWays, NAT'L CATHOLIC REP. (Mar.
12, 2004), available at http://natcath.org/NCROnline/archives2/2004a/031204/
031204c.htm (discussing hierarchy and church resistance to changing status quo).
One member emphasized the lack of communication among dioceses and between bishops and the Vatican. See id. (quoting National Review Board member,
Leon Panetta).
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16 1
The consequence of the
tern is divinely inspired and constructed. "
church structure is that it has empowered bishops to address clergy sexual
162
abuse in a manner inconsistent with canon law.
1 63
The Code of Canon Law directly addresses clergy sexual abuse.
Canon 1395.2 states:

If a cleric has otherwise committed an offense against the sixth
commandment of the Decalogue with force or threats or publicly
or with a minor below the age of sixteen, the cleric is to be punished with just penalties, including dismissal from the clerical
16 4
state if the case warrants it.
In addition to constituting a violation of Canon 1395.2, clergy that engage
in sexual acts with minors also violate Canons 227 and 1389.165 Following
161. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 598 ("The basic claim of the divine
origin of episcopal power is defended through authentication by interpretations of
scripture and events in Church history."); Garvey, supra note 159, at 858 (explaining that Catholic laity shares the belief that bishops have direct connection with
God); see also Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 588 (discussing bishops' self-identities in context of their responses to clergy sexual abuse). Victims of abuse have
criticized bishops of preserving church stability at the exclusion of addressing
clergy sexual abuse allegations. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 588 (noting
victims' concerns that bishops ignore clergy sexual abuse accusations).
162. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 558-59 ("Although the mandate for
a structured and documented investigation into allegations of sexual abuse by the
clergy is unequivocal, diocesan bishops have customarily handled such reports in a
much more informal manner, relying on their unquestioned status to do so."); see
also Coughlin, supra note 2, at 984-92 (discussing bishops' failure to follow canon
law). See generally id. at 992-96 (describing consequences of deviating from canon
law).
163. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 555 (explaining that canon law specifies procedures to address clergy sexual abuse). Canon law addressing clergy sexual misconduct has existed since the Code of Canon Law was first codified in 1917.
See Coughlin, supra note 2, at 977 (remarking that canon law addressing clergy
sexual abuse has existed for long period); Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 574
(tracing origin of canon law relating to sexual misconduct by clerics).
164. 1983 CODE c.1395, § 2. See generally Msgr. John A. Alesandro, A Study of
Canon Law: Dismissal From the Clerical State in Cases of Sexual Misconduct, 36 CATH.
LAw 257, 270-73 (1996) (discussing elements and application of Canon 1395).
Violation of Canon 1395 is "one of four classifications of sexual offenses for which
a man may be permanently removed from the clerical state." Coughlin, supranote
2, at 980. It is one of the most severe penalties in canon law. See id. (illustrating
gravity of offense within canon law).
165. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 556 (acknowledging that sexual
abuse of minors violates several canons in 1983 Code). Canon 227 addresses violations of celibacy. See 1983 CODE c.277, § 1 (providing rules relating to celibacy). It
states:
Clerics are obliged to observe perfect and perpetual continence for the
sake of the Kingdom of heaven, and are therefore bound to celibacy.
Celibacy is a special gift of God by which sacred ministers can more easily
remain close to Christ with an undivided heart, and can dedicate themselves more freely to the service of God and their neighbor.
Id. (explaining requirement and purpose of celibacy). Canon 1389 addresses
abuse of "ecclesiastical power." See 1983 CODE c.1389, § 1. It states that "[o]ne

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005

31

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50: p. 261

allegations that a cleric has violated one of the above-mentioned canons,
bishops must follow procedures outlined in the Code. 16 6 The Holy See
16 7
may impose penal sanctions on bishops failing to do SO.
Despite the thorough treatment of clergy sexual abuse in the Code,
bishops have underutilized the processes outlined within it.' 68 The hierarchical structure has allowed this result because bishops operate virtually
unchecked. 169 Rather than use the proscribed penalties, "bishops opted
for a therapeutic approach to the exclusion of correcting the grave injury
[of clergy sexual abuse] through the rule of canon law."' 70 Many bishops
who abuses ecclesiastical power or function is to be punished in accord with the
seriousness of the act or omission not excluding deprivation from office unless a
penalty for such abuse has already been established by a law or a precept." Id.
166. See Coughlin, supra note 2, at 980-81 (discussing investigatory and judicial prongs of procedures outlined in 1983 Code); Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8,
at 556-58 (detailing procedural requirements for investigation and judicial proceedings). After receiving "facially valid" information about sexual abuse, which
may include "rumor[s], hearsay, and anonymous sources," bishops must investigate. See id. at 556-57 (likening investigatory process to "a common law grand
jury"). During this process, bishops must document their actions and findings. See
id. (describing administrative requirements). If, following the investigation, judicial proceedings are warranted, a panel of three "collegiate judges" will conduct
the proceedings. See Alesandro, supra note 164, at 284 (discussing judicial proceedings); Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 556-57 (same). In some instances of
"clear or notorious cases, however, permanent dismissal may be imposed on a
guilty cleric through a simple administrative procedure." Coughlin, supra note 2,
at 981.
167. See Coughlin, supra note 2, at 980 (describing penalty bishops face when
failing to utilize applicable canon law). The Holy See governs Vatican City. See
CIA, WORLD FACTBOOK, Holy See (Vatican City) (Nov. 18, 2004), available at http://
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/vt.html (providing facts about Holy
See). The Holy See sets the Vatican's foreign policy and "cultivates relations between individual States and the Church." See Thomas D. Grant, Between Diversity
and Disorder:A Review ofJorriC. Duursma, Fragmentationand the InternationalRelations
of Micro-States: Self-Determination and Statehood, 12 Am.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 629, 672

(1997) (describing function of Holy See).
168. See Alesandro, supra note 164, at 258 ("Most bishops have been loath to
invoke the process in the Code of Canon Law for the punitive dismissal of the
priest from the clerical state."); Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 558 (noting that,
despite its existence, canon law addressing clergy sexual abuse "has rarely been
utilized"); see also Coughlin, supranote 2, at 978 (stating that "many-and perhaps
most-bishops declined to implement and enforce the rule of canon law").
169. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 558 (discussing lack of limitations
on bishops' power). Cardinal Bernard Law's transfer of abusive priest John Geoghan among church parishes illustrates the discretion afforded to bishops in addressing clergy sexual abuse. For a discussion of Cardinal Law's response to
allegations that Father John Geoghan sexually abused minors, see supra notes
14-16 and accompanying text.
170. Coughlin, supra note 2, at 986 (describing response that was contrary to
canon law); see Goodstein, supra note 2, at 1 (discussing use of treatment centers
and their inefficiencies). But see Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 587 (contending
that bishops viewed sexual abuse as "moral failing" rather than psychological
impairment).
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sent abusive priests to treatment centers. 171 These bishops sometimes enabled the abusive priests to return to their ministries following ineffective
treatment.' 72 They did not, however, consistently disclose the priests' pre173
vious abuse.
2.

Internal Discipline Structure of the Catholic Church

While the church hierarchical structure contributed to the extent of
the sexual abuse scandal, the church preference for internal discipline
174
The church handled allegations of
had a similarly detrimental effect.
171. See Coughlin, supra note 2, at 986-87 (describing influence of therapeutic approach on bishops' responses to clergy sexual abuse). Bishops' preference
for therapeutic treatment was not malicious. See id. at 987 (same). In fact, it was
consistent with "a general trend" in the 1970s and 1980s. See id. (same). Psychologists at that time believed that reform was possible through treatment. See id.
(same). Furthermore, bishops' use of psychological treatment probably comported with the advice of lawyers. See id. (same). Unfortunately, treatment did not
sufficiently cure "true pedophiles who commit serial sexual abuse." Id. In 2002,
bishops responded to the abuse scandal by discarding the therapeutic approach to
clergy sexual abuse. See id. at 990 (chronicling reform approach taken by bishops
following their realization that therapeutic approach was not solving crisis). They
"elected to correct the decades-long absence of canonical response with a rule of
strict criminal liability." Id.
172. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 572 (discussing bishops' responses
to psychologists' recommendations). Church-affiliated treatment centers, frequently used to help sexually abusive clerics, were largely ineffective. See id. at
570-71 (explaining that clergy approach to sexual dysfunction was no different,
and no more successful, than approach used in middle ages). For example, the
Paraclete Fathers' program, located in Minnesota, did not isolate sufficiently abusive priests from parishioners. See id. (criticizing treatment center's policy, which
permitted priests to work at church parishes on weekends). More importantly,
bishops did not consistently abide by psychologists' recommendations following a
priest's treatment. See id. at 572 (noting that bishops allowed priests to return to
parishes because they both misconstrued and ignored psychologists' recommendations). The director of psychology at the Institute of Living, a facility that has
treated sexually abusive priests, recommends that these priests continue receiving
treatment during their lives and do not return to active ministry. See Lothstein Interview, supra note 149 (expressing frustration with bishops' decision to return abusive priests to ministry).
173. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 572 (discussing bishops' secrecy).
James Gill, Jesuit priest and psychologist, rationalized bishops' nondisclosure of
past abuse by explaining, "the Catholic Church, a secretive organization by nature,
'[was] unaccustomed to the full disclosure required in treatment centers.'" Id.
Still, revelations about previous nondisclosure bred even more hostility among
those criticizing the transfer of abusive priests to new parishes. See O'Reilly &
Strasser, supra note 4, at 33 (describing reactions of church critics to bishops'
nondisclosure).
174. See Carmella, supra note 3, at 1032 (noting church's treatment of clergy
sexual abuse as "internal personnel matters" made it unable to properly address
crisis); see also Logan, supra note 110, at 321 ("[T]he Catholic Church itself, rather
than acting decisively to end the victimizations and facilitate prosecutions, had
engaged in a systematic effort to shield predator priests dating back several decades."); Lothstein Inteiview, supra note 149 (expressing dissatisfaction with internal
discipline structure).
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clergy sexual abuse internally, excluding civil authorities. 1 75 There is speculation as to why the church chose to do SO. 1 7 6 The church may have
believed its discipline policies were adequate. 177 The policies were not,
however, utilized. 17 8 Another, more cynical possibility is that the church
wished to keep private "potentially damaging internal documents."1 79 Regardless of the reason for the disposition to internal policing of its own,
the historic role of "sanctuary" supplements an understanding of the
church's treatment of abusive clergy. 180
For hundreds of years, Christian churches provided sanctuary from
criminal liability. 18 ' Almost all criminals could obtain protection and,
"[i]f sanctuary were successfully secured, the church would not surrender
the beneficiary unless the party seeking custody would attest that the al-

175. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 587 (remarking that bishops failed
to contact civil authorities even if reporting statutes required them to do so); Logan, supra note 110, at 332 (describing instances in which bishops protected abusive priests from civil authorities). The practice of protecting abusive clergy from
civil authorities is now changing. See id. at 334 (describing recent church acquiescence). The church has recently "bowed to public pressure and grudgingly disclosed the names of priests accused of sexual abuse over the decades." Id. (same).
176. See Logan, supra note 110, at 335 (considering possible reasons why
church favored internal discipline that permitted abuse to continue).
177. See id. (offering "benign explanation" for church's actions). Church perceptions about the character of abusive priests may have increased its confidence
,in the internal discipline structure. See Goodstein, supra note 2, at 1 (explaining
that clergy regarded sexual abusers as sinners rather than criminals).
178. For a discussion of the bishops' failure to address clergy sexual abuse in
accordance with canon law, see supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
179. See Logan, supra note 110, at 335 (suggesting "less benign" reason for
church's actions). Hiding harmful documents may have been an aspect of the
church's "damage control." See id. (discussing explanations for church's willingness to protect abusive priests). Bishops purposely purged priests' files to prevent
use of the files in lawsuits. See Smith, supra note 2, at 412 (quoting Aric Press et al.,
Priests and Abuse, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 16, 1993, at 42-43).
180. See Logan, supra note 110, at 330-36 (discussing elements of sanctuary in
bishops' response to clergy sexual abuse). "[T] here is no mistaking the vestiges of
sanctuary in the [c]hurch's response to allegations of abuse by its priests, euphemistically referred to as being 'in between assignments."' Id. at 336. Despite warnings in 1985 that clergy sexual abuse had become a widespread problem in the
church, church officials failed to take permanent actions against abusive priests.
See id. (commenting on church response to warnings by 1985 internal oversight
board). Instead, the church sent the priests for treatment and later returned them
to new parish assignments. See id. (noting that warnings of clergy abuse did not
lead to changes in church structures or reports to civil authorities).
181. See id. at 323-24 (describing long history of sanctuary in church). Although the church developed sanctuary "to extend protection to the innocent maliciously pursued, to the injured, to the oppressed, and the unfortunate . . . [in
time it] was so much extended that the most atrocious and guilty of malefactors
could be found enjoying immunity within sacred walls and bidding defiance to the
civil power." Id. at 325 (quoting NORMAN MACLAREN TRENHOLME, THE RIGHT OF
SANCTUARY IN ENGLAND: A STUDY IN INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 9 (1903)).
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182
Sanctuary
leged wrongdoer would remain free from immediate harm."
18 3
century.
seventeenth
the
in
however,
steadily declined,
Despite the demise of official sanctuary, the clergy abuse scandal has
revealed that "the Church proved remarkably effective in affording sanctuary to abusive priests since the early 1960s."184 The practice of transferring previously abusive priests to new parishes is illustrative of that
sanctuary. 185 For example, the church protected Father John Geoghan
and Father Paul Shanley, both of whom were accused of sexually abusing
minors.18 6 Rather than alerting civil authorities, the church transferred
the men to various parishes for almost three decades. 18 7 Both continued
their patterns of abuse, victimizing more minors at each subsequent parish. 188 The church's internal response, then, permitted clergy sexual
89
abuse in these circumstances to continue.'

3.

Recent Changes in Church Structure and Policy

Recently, the church responded proactively to the institutional causes
of clergy sexual abuse. 19 0 At its summer 2002 meeting in Dallas, Texas,
182. Id. at 325. In England, church sanctuary protected approximately one
thousand people a year. See id. at 329 (explaining pervasiveness of sanctuary).
183. See id. at 329 (explaining reasons for demise of sanctuary). Sanctuary
diminished as judicial processes became more fair and effective. See id. (explaining that sanctuary protected accused from "immediate blood revenge"). Additionally, the state wished to exert control over the fraudulent debtors and "political
enemies of the King" who had taken advantage of church sanctuary. See id. (explaining that use of sanctuary by these individuals contributed to demise of
sanctuary).
184. See id. at 331 (discussing role played by church in shielding abusive
priests from legal punishment).
185. See id. at 332 (discussing transfer of two abusive priests to illustrate vestiges of sanctuary in church's actions).
186. See id. (specifying instances where church protected known sexual
pedophiles); see also Frank Bruni, Crime and Punishment; Prosecutingthe Church, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2002, at 4 (discussing church's knowledge of Shanley's abuse and
his subsequent transfers); Rezendes, supra note 14, at Al (tracing Geoghan's abusive history). For a discussion of Geoghan's abusive behavior and his transfer to
multiple parishes, see supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
187. See Logan, supra note 110, at 332 (explaining manner in which church
protected Geoghan and Shanley); Bruni, supranote 186, at 4 (discussing Shanley's
transfer to California and Manhattan Catholic guest houses despite knowledge of
sexual abuse allegations against Shanley); Rezendes, supra note 14, at Al (discussing Geoghan's various reassignments).
188. See Logan, supra note 110, at 332 (noting that transferring Geoghan and
Shanley did not stop cycle of abuse); Rezendes, supra note 14, at Al (describing
Geoghan's pattern of sexual abuse).
189. See Logan, supra note 110, at 335 (expressing opinion that protection of
abusive priests contributed to continuation of clergy sexual abuse); see also McNamara, supra note 13, at BI (characterizing church response to clergy sexual abuse
as "most obvious sign of institutional dysfunction").
190. See Logan, supranote 110, at 336 (explaining that church reevaluated its
response to clergy sexual abuse atJune 2002 meeting of UCCB); Charter,supra note
138 (altering church practices in response to clergy sexual abuse of minors).
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the UCCB adopted the Charter for the Protection of Children & Young
People ("Charter"). 191 In the Charter's Preamble, the bishops acknowledged the "crisis" in the church and accepted responsibility for their role
in the scandal. 19 2 Moreover, the bishops addressed the veil of secrecy that
previously shrouded clergy sexual abuse and expressed a preference for
openness. 193 To counteract past ills, the Charter established new policies
194
to address abuse in the church.
The Vatican responded negatively to policies established by the Charter. 19 5 The UCCB considered the Vatican's concerns and responded by
191. See Charter,supra note 138 (establishing new church procedures to respond to clergy sexual abuse of minors); see also Logan, supra note 110, at 336
(describing institutional changes proposed by Charter); O'Brien, supra note 2, at
371-72 (describing UCCB meeting and characterizing adoption of Charter as response to "American model of accountability, repentance, and restitution").
192. See Charter, supra note 138 ("As bishops, we acknowledge our mistakes
and our role in that suffering, and we apologize and take responsibility for too
often failing victims and our people in the past.").
193. See id. (acknowledging secrecy in Preamble and incorporating policy of
openness in Article 7). The Charter addresses the church's historical preference
for secrecy by requiring openness with law enforcement and the community at
large. See id. (announcing new church procedures in recognition of current clergy
sexual abuse crisis). Dioceses must report allegations of clergy sexual abuse of
minors to public authorities. See id. (same). This policy change could help dioceses reduce the financial strain created by the clergy sexual abuse scandal because, by reporting sexual abuse to civil authorities, the dioceses' liability will
decrease or be eliminated. See Smith, supra note 2, at 418 (discussing advantages
of reporting priests' abuse). In addition to requiring reports to civil authorities,
the Charter prohibits confidentiality agreements except in extenuating circumstances. See Charter, supra note 138 (announcing new church procedures). Furthermore, each diocese must "develop a communications policy that reflects a
commitment to transparency and openness." Id.
194. See Charter, supra note 138 (enumerating new policies to address clergy
sexual abuse). The Charter instituted procedures to promote healing, to ensure
effective responses, to promote accountability and to prevent future abuse. See id.
(same). To facilitate its goals, the Charter built a multi-layer hierarchy of oversight
entities. See id. (same). First, it required that dioceses have review boards comprised mainly of laypeople who "advise [the dioceses' bishops] in [their] assessment of allegations of sexual abuse." See id. (same). Second, to ensure uniform
compliance with procedures, the Charter created the Office for Child and Youth
Protection to aid dioceses in their implementation of Charter programs. See id.
(same). Finally, the Charter required a National Review Board to monitor the
Office of Child and Youth Protection. See id. (same). Its envisioned responsibilities include approving recommendations and commissioning a study to enable a
clearer understanding of clergy sexual abuse. See id. (same).
195. See Logan, supra note 110, at 337 (discussing Vatican's disagreement with
Charter's "zero tolerance" policy and mandatory reporting to civil authorities); see
also Frank Bruni, The Vatican Is Rejecting an Erosion of Authority, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
2002, at Al (explaining that Vatican's negative response stemmed from concerns
that Charter opened church to oversight by laypeople disconnected with church
hierarchy). The Vatican expressed concerns that the Charter's "zero tolerance"
policy did not comport with "[c]hurch notions of due process and fairness." Id.
The Vatican disagreed with the mandatory reporting requirement because it
would threaten the bishop-priest relationship. See id. (explaining Vatican's concern that distrustful relationship would develop between bishops and priests).
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developing the Essential Norms for Diocesan/Eparchial Policies Dealing
with Allegations of Sexual Abuse of Minors by Priests or Deacons
("Norms"). 1 9 6 The Norms softened the Charter's "zero tolerance" policy,
which required the removal of priests when there are credible accusations
of sexual abuse of minors. 197 Under the Norms, priests found guilty of
sexually abusing minors will lose ministerial authority but will not automatically be dismissed from the clerical state. 198 Additionally, the Norms altered the Charter's requirement that bishops report all sexual abuse of
minors to civil authorities. 19 9 Under the Norms, bishops must only report
to civil authorities when civil law in that jurisdiction requires them to do
SO.

200

While the Charter and Norms are positive steps in addressing the
problem of clergy sexual abuse, reporting patterns of clergy sexual abuse
victims suggest that revelations of pre-Charter/Norms abuse will continue

196. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Essential Norms for Diocesan/
EparchialPolicies Dealing with Allegations of Sexual Abuse of Minors by Priests orDeacons
(Dec. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Norms], available at http:www.usccb.org/ocyp/norms.

htm (decreeing norms for diocese/eparchies to aid them in addressing allegations
of clergy sexual abuse of minors); see also Ladislas Orsy, Bishops' Norms: Commentary

and Evaluation, 44 B.C. L. REv. 999, 999 (2003) (critically analyzing Norms). The
Norms apply to Catholic bishops in the United States. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF
CATHOLIC BISHOPS, OFFICE OF CHILD AND YOUTH PROTECTION, FAQs, available at
www.usccb.org/ocyp/faqs.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2004) (explaining force of
Norms). Bishops who do not comply with the Norms face canonical penalty. See
id. (noting that Norms have greater force of law than does Charter because Norms
are "particular" canon law: canon law applicable to specified group).
197. See Logan, supra note 110, at 337 (explaining differences between Charter and Norms).
198. See Norms, supra note 196 (explaining that priest must "lead a life of
prayer and penance" if not dismissed from clerical state).
199. See Logan, supra note 110, at 338 (explaining differences in reporting
requirements between Charter and Norms). Compare Charter,supra note 138 ("Dioceses/eparchies will report an allegation of sexual abuse of a person who is a minor to the public authorities."), with Norms, supra note 196 ("The diocese/eparchy
will comply with all applicable civil laws with respect to the reporting of allegations
of sexual abuse of minors to civil authorities and will cooperate in their
investigation.").
200. See Norms, supra note 196 (softening reporting requirement of Charter).
Victims' groups were displeased with the Norms. See Logan, supra note 110, at 338
(remarking that victims' displeasure was not surprising). They viewed the Norms
as "considerably less ambitious" than the Charter. See id. (describing victims'
groups preference for Charter over Norms). The groups expressed concerns that
the changes did not effectively address secrecy or the church's power of discretion.
See id. (explaining victims' criticism of Norms).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005

37

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 5
298

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50: p. 261

in the coming years. 20 ' Victims often delay in reporting abuse. 20 2 Therefore, the church's institutional changes do not negate the need to reexam20 3
ine charitable immunity.
C.

FinancialReality

In response to allegations of clergy sexual abuse, many dioceses across
the country have entered into settlement agreements with victims. 20 4 The
settlements are admirable because they provide expedited compensation. 20 5 The choice to settle claims with victims, however, has not come
201. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 607 (noting that adults brought
many clergy sexual abuse actions against church, alleging they were victims of sexual abuse as minors). The emotional trauma, unique to clergy sexual abuse, is one
explanation for the delayed reporting. See id. (offering potential reason for
delayed reporting of clergy sexual abuse). "The victims are mentally and emotionally impeded to such a profound degree, that they are unable to come forward
because of the overpowering experience with the cleric." Id.; see also Smith, supra
note 2, at 413 (explaining that victims of clergy sexual abuse often delay revealing
abuse because it may destroy their "belief system").
202. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 607 (discussing delayed reports of
clergy sexual abuse). Many clergy sexual abuse victims do not bring actions against
the church until they reach adulthood. See Goodstein, supra note 2, at 1 (quoting
physician who treated abuse victims and noting that many victims do not report
abuse until their mid-20s). This phenomenon is common to sexual abuse of minors in general. See David McCord, Criminal Law: Expert Psychological Testimony
About Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions:A Foray into the Admissibility of
Novel PsychologicalEvidence, 77J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 61 (1986) (explaining
that experts acknowledge "that it is not unusual for a child to delay in reporting
sexual abuse"). Delayed reporting presents a problem in some states because statutes of limitations may preclude litigation. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 954 (commenting on states' statutes of limitation). Many states, however, have adopted a
delayed discovery rule. See id. (explaining attempts of many states to alleviate statute of limitations problems for victims who bring allegations of abuse many years
after incident). Under a delayed discovery rule, the statute of limitation is triggered only when "the victim knows or reasonably should know, that [he or] she
has been injured by sexual abuse." See id. (discussing delayed discovery rule).
203. For a discussion of amendments to the Charitable Immunity Act, proposed since adoption of the Charter and Norms, see supranote 74 and accompanying text.
204. See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 4, at 37 (characterizing expenses for
lawsuits or settlements as theme in clergy sexual abuse scandal) : Schiltz, supra note
4, at 951 (noting that high cost of settlements are consequence of clergy sexual
abuse litigation); Rita Ciolli, Still WaitingforJudgment Day, NEWSDAY, Oct. 26, 2003,
at A03 (observing that many dioceses across country have chosen to settle clergy
sexual abuse claims with victims). Due to confidentiality agreements entered into
by the church prior to "official court filings," it is impossible to know the exact
amount the church has paid in civil settlements to date. See Logan, supranote 110,
at 332-33 (discussing costs church has incurred in protection of abusive priests).
205. See Wells, supra note 2, at 1227 (advocating settlements because they
compensate victims quicker than legal system). But see Mark A. Sargent, Legal Defense: When Sued, How Should the Church Behave, VILL. MAG. (2002), available at
http://www.publicrelations.villanova.edu/magazine/archives/summer2002/legal.
defense.htm ("Even the mere attempt to negotiate the amount of a cash settlement to a lower level than that demanded by the plaintiff may be thought of as a
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without a price. 20 6 Settlement costs are extremely high and have crippled
20 7
some dioceses.
Although the Charitable Immunity Act shields New Jersey dioceses
from tort liability arising out of clergy sexual abuse, the dioceses have nevertheless chosen to enter into settlement agreements, which have drained
large sums from their funds. 20 8 New Jersey dioceses reported their settlement costs as part of the survey commissioned by the UCCB. 20 9 The Paterson Diocese reported paying $2.8 million in settlements and legal
nasty lawyerly trick reflecting the church's basic unwillingness to accept its
responsibilities.").
206. See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 4, at 37 (explaining that treating victims of abuse is expensive component of settlements); Schiltz, supra note 4, at 951
(noting that churches must expend "hundreds of millions of dollars" in legal fees
and settlements); see also John Jay Study, supra note 137 (providing statistical data
about cost to church of clergy sexual abuse). In many states, dioceses have paid
multi-million dollar settlements. See Epstein, supra note 11, at 416-17 (listing settlement amounts for various dioceses). In 2002, for example, the Diocese of Tucson, Arizona, settled eleven lawsuits for close to $15 million. See id. (highlighting
settlement figures for particular dioceses). In 2003, the Archdiocese of Louisville,
Kentucky entered into a settlement for $25.7 million, and the Archdiocese of Seattle, Washington agreed to settle 15 lawsuits for $7.87 million. See id. (same).
The survey commissioned by the UCCB revealed the total cost of clergy sexual
abuse on dioceses between 1950 and 2002. See JohnJay Study, supra note 137 (providing statistical data about cost of clergy sexual abuse scandal). Excluding the $85
million settlement recently entered into by the Boston Archdiocese, the nation's
dioceses have expended $499,582,192.35. See id. (same). This figure includes victim compensation and treatment, priest treatment and attorney fees. See id. (explaining cost components considered in study). It excludes the amount covered
by insurance. See id. (same). Victim compensation and treatment combined cost
dioceses a total of $439,941,289.59. See id. (reporting costs minus attorneys' fees
awarded).
207. See Epstein, supra note 11, at 416 (stating that average settlements in
United States reached $1 million by early 1990s); Mickey Ciokajlo, Church Pays $4
Million to 4for Abuse; Archdiocese Selling Land to Raise Money, CHI. TRIB.,July 10, 2003,
at 1 (discussing consequences of high settlement costs for Archdiocese of Chicago); Editorial, Room for Boston College, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 23, 2004, at A22 (dis-

cussing Boston Archdiocese's decision to sell property to pay for recent $85
million settlement). Large settlements have led dioceses to sell real estate and
reduce services offered to parish members. See Epstein, supra note 11, at 417 (noting that Diocese of Dallas sold property to pay for 1997 settlement); Ciokajlo, supra
(reporting that Archdiocese of Chicago has sold real estate and closed schools to
address its debt); Room for Boston College, supra (discussing Boston Archdiocese's
sale of "the archdiocesan complex in Brighton" to Boston College).
208. See Chadwick, supra note 7, at A01 (noting that Charitable Immunity Act
has not prevented New Jersey dioceses from paying large settlements to victims of
clergy sexual abuse).
209. See generally In PatersonDiocese, 4 % Were Accused of Sex Abuse; Church Report
Serves as a Start for Dialogue, DAILY REc. (Morristown, N.J.), Feb. 28, 2004, at IA
[hereinafter PatersonDiocese] (explaining reason for dioceses' disclosure). In addition to reporting information about clergy sexual abuse to the UCCB, dioceses also
informed their parishioners of the statistics. See id. (noting that dioceses distributed church-run newspapers with clergy abuse statistics to parishioners).
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fees.2 10 The Camden Diocese paid more than twice that amount-$5.7
million. 2 11 Combined, New Jersey's five dioceses have paid $12.8 million
212
in settlements and counseling for victims of clergy sexual abuse.
New Jersey dioceses offer various explanations for their willingness to
213
settle clergy sexual abuse cases in spite of the Charitable Immunity Act.
First, some believe settlements to be the "best option" because the lawsuits
often include many plaintiffs. 2 1 4 Second, diocesan officials cite "a loophole in the law [since corrected] that made them uncomfortable with using [charitable immunity] as a defense in every case."215 Finally,
settlements may be beneficial because they allow a more expeditious recovery for victims.2 1 6 The Camden Diocese, in particular, expressed this
sentiment.2 17 In a statement released by the Diocese of Camden following
a settlement with twenty-three plaintiffs, Bishop Nicholas DiMarzio ex210. See id. (discussing statistics reported by Paterson Diocese). The Paterson
Diocese is comprised of three counties: Morris, Sussex and Passaic. See id. (describing geographic area within Paterson Diocese). Over the past fifty years, the diocese has had credible accusations of sexual abuse relating to thirty priests and one
deacon. See id. (discussing prevalence of abuse in Paterson Diocese). Out of New
Jersey's five dioceses-Paterson, Camden, Metuchen, Trenton and the Archdiocese of Newark-the Paterson Diocese had the highest percentage of priests accused of sexual abuse. See id. (comparing abuse allegations among New Jersey
dioceses).
211. See id. (providing results of church-initiated review that tabulated
amounts paid in settlements and fees by various dioceses in New Jersey). Compared to the five New Jersey dioceses, Camden paid the most in settlement and
counseling costs. See id. (same). The Camden Diocese received media attention in
2003 for a $880,000 settlement with twenty-three plaintiffs. See id. (describing
high-profile NewJersey clergy sexual abuse action). The plaintiffs in that litigation
alleged abuse occurring between the 1960s and 1980s. See id. (same).
212. See id. (reporting aggregated costs for all New Jersey dioceses). The
$12.8 million paid by New Jersey dioceses contributes to the $772 million total
spent by Roman Catholic dioceses nationwide in addressing the clergy sexual
abuse scandal. See Cathy Lynn Grossman & Anthony DeBarros, Church Struggles
with Change, USA TODAY, Nov. 8, 2004, at 1D (reporting total amount spent by
church in scandal to date).
213. See Chadwick, supra note 7, at A01 (reporting two reasons diocesan officials provided for entering into settlement agreements: large number of plaintiffs
and previous loophole in statute that made officials hesitant to use statute's protection); see also DIOCESE OF CAMDEN, Settlement Reached in Sexual Abuse Case (Mar. 13,
2003) [hereinafter Camden Settlement], at http://www.camdendiocese.org/pdf/
statement.FINAL.pdf (expressing hope that settlements aid victims in recovery).
214. See Chadwick, supra note 7, at A01 (identifying one reason given by dioceses for settling).
215. Id. Until a 1995 amendment to the Charitable Immunity Act altered the
statute, victims could not sue employees or volunteers who were grossly negligent.
See id. (reiterating reasons given by diocese for not using Charitable Immunity Act
as defense). This previous loophole made some officials hesitant to invoke the
protection of the Act. See id. (same).
216. See Wells, supra note 2, at 1227 (praising settlements because they enable
victims to avoid slow legal proceedings).
217. See Camden Settlement, supra note 213 (expressing hope that settlement
with twenty-three plaintiffs will expedite healing process). In a statement released
following the Camden Diocese's $880,000 settlement with twenty-three alleged vic-
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plained, "I am hopeful that this reconciliation will speed the process of
2 18
healing for those who have been harmed in any way."
Diocesan decisions to settle clergy sexual abuse lawsuits may undermine the legislative intent of the Charitable Immunity Act. 2 19 The legislature reinstated charitable immunity in order to preserve the assets of
charitable entities. 220 Instead, settlements have depleted millions of dollars from New Jersey dioceses. 221 Although technically immune from liability arising out of negligent supervision or hiring, the church has
222
compensated victims rather than rely on the protection of the Act.
V.

CONCLUSION

Since its dubious inception in this country, a majority of states have
abolished the doctrine of charitable immunity. 223 Specifically, the revelation that English courts rejected the doctrine, combined with evolving societal priorities, impacted state court decisions. 224 New Jersey, however,
2 25
has resisted the majority rule and has retained charitable immunity.
The NewJersey Charitable Immunity Act provides nearly complete protec22 6
tion to charitable entities in tort actions arising out of negligence.
tims of clergy abuse, the diocese's bishop expressed his hope that the settlement
would expedite the victims' healing processes. See id. (same).
218. Id. The plaintiffs were not entirely pleased with the settlement entered
into by the Diocese of Camden. See O'Reilly, supra note 3, at A01 (reporting Camden Diocese settlement). They had sought $50 million from the diocese, but received only $880,000. See id. (same). However, plaintiffs were pleased "they had
succeeded in helping to expose clergy sex abuse." See id. (same).
219. See Chadwick, supra note 7, at A01 (noting that Charitable Immunity Act
has not prevented New Jersey dioceses from paying large settlements to victims of
clergy sexual abuse); cf. Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 472 A.2d 531, 537
(N.J. 1984) (citing Exemption of Religious, Charitable and Hospital Organizationsfrom
Negligence Liability: Hearing on S. 204 Before the Assembly Judiciary Committee, 1958
Leg., 188th Sess. (N.J. 1958)) (identifying economic concerns as focus of Charitable Immunity Act); Vitale Statement, supra note 22 (identifying original purpose of
Charitable Immunity Act).
220. See Schultz, 422 A.2d at 537 (remarking that legislature emphasized economic consequences of abolishing charitable immunity).
221. See Paterson Diocese, supra note 209, at IA (providing settlement figures
for New Jersey dioceses). For a discussion of settlements entered into by the
church in New Jersey, see supra notes 204-22 and accompanying text.
222. See Chadwick, supra note 7, at A01 (explaining that Charitable Immunity
Act has not hindered New Jersey dioceses' willingness to settle claims for large
sums).

223. See

RESTATEMENT TORTS,

supra note 4, § 895E cmt. d (commenting that

majority of states have abolished charitable immunity); see also Chopko, supra note
4, at 1089-90 (remarking that almost all jurisdictions limit charitable immunity).
224. See Bottari, supra note 19, at 62-63 (explaining that rejection of doctrine
stemmed both from revelation that English abolished charitable immunity and
"evolving public needs").
225. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 2004) (providing charitable immunity to New Jersey nonprofit organizations).
226. See id. (enumerating parameters of charitable immunity in New Jersey).
Employees of charitable organizations receive less protection-they are not immu-
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Consideration of the Charitable Immunity Act in light of the clergy
sexual abuse scandal has impacted the argument that the New Jersey legislature should amend the statute. 22 7 Several aspects of the scandal are relevant to a critique of charitable immunity in clergy sexual abuse actions. 22 8
First, clergy sexual abuse victims are distinguishable from the occasional
victims of negligence the Act originally contemplated. 2 29 Next, church
hierarchal and internal discipline structures created an environment in
which clergy members could continuously abuse minors under a veil of
23 1
secrecy. 2 30 The church did not intentionally seek to achieve this result.
The widespread nature of the abuse was the unfortunate consequence of
mistakes the church admits to making. 232 Finally, the response of New
Jersey dioceses to clergy sexual abuse litigation reveals that the Act is not
serving its purpose, as originally contemplated by the legislature. 23 3 The
legislature revived charitable immunity in New Jersey to preserve charitable funds. 234 Yet, New Jersey dioceses have repeatedly settled actions
nized from liability arising out of gross negligence. For a discussion of the distinction between the immunity afforded to employees and charitable organizations,
see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
227. See Chadwick, supra note 7, at A01 ("In the wake of the crisis in the Catholic Church, the [NewJersey Charitable Immunity Act] has become the focal point
in a battle for change."). For a discussion of proposed amendments to the Charitable Immunity Act, see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
228. For a discussion of elements of the clergy sexual abuse scandal relevant
to a critique of charitable immunity, which include the widespread nature of
abuse, institutional concerns and the church's propensity to settle clergy abuse
claims, see supra notes 140-222 and accompanying text.
229. See John Jay Study, supra note 137 (providing statistical data relating to
church clergy sexual abuse scandal); cf. Bottari, supra note 19, at 85 (commenting
that NewJersey Charitable Immunity Act balances interest of charitable entity with
"occasional victims" of negligence).
230. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 615 (discussing impact of hierarchical structure on bishops' responses to clergy sexual abuse); Logan, supra note 110,
at 321 (discussing impact of church's preference for internal disciplining of abusive clergy).
231. See Coughlin, supra note 2, at 977 (remarking that canon law addressing
clergy sexual abuse has existed for long time); Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at
555 (explaining that canon law specifies procedures to address clergy sexual
abuse).
232. See Doyle & Rubino, supra note 8, at 558, 587 (describing hierarchical
structure and bishops' response to clergy sexual abuse); Logan, supra note 110, at
332 (discussing internal discipline and practice of shielding priests from civil authorities); Charter,supra note 138 ("As bishops, we acknowledge our mistakes and
our role in that suffering, and we apologize and take responsibility for too often
failing victims and our people in the past.").
233. See Chadwick, supra note 7, at A01 (explaining that Charitable Immunity
Act has not hindered New Jersey dioceses' willingness to settle claims for large
sums).
234. See Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 472 A.2d 531, 537 (N.J.
1984) (citing Exemption of Religious, Charitable and Hospital Organizationsfrom Negligence Liability: Hearing on S. 204 Before the Assembly Judiciary Committee, 1958 Leg.,

188th Sess. (NJ. 1958)) (identifying economic concerns as focus of Charitable Im-
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brought by plaintiffs. 235 In doing so, the dioceses have expended millions
2 36
of dollars from the church coffers.
Because charitable immunity in clergy sexual abuse actions may not
be appropriate or effective based on the number of victims, the church's
role in the abuse and the propensity of state dioceses to settle claims, the
New Jersey legislature should consider taking the suggestion offered in
Shultz-reconsideration of the Act and its "application to new theories of
liability. ' 2 37 The state legislature can alter the Charitable Immunity Act by
carving out an exception to immunity where negligence has resulted in
the sexual abuse of a minor.2 38 Church officials oppose this option because they fear "costly lawsuits" will result.2 39 Still, despite the protection
offered by the Act, New Jersey dioceses have not avoided costly
240
settlements.
Until the legislature commits to changing the New Jersey Charitable
Immunity Act, options for victims of clergy sexual abuse remain limited to
collecting damages from the meager assets of their abusers. 241 Although
state dioceses have proven willing to settle, victims are not guaranteed recovery because the church can effectively claim immunity. 2 4 2 Therefore,

munity Act); Vitale Statement, supra note 22 (identifying legislative concerns about
proper use of charitable funds).
235. See Chadwick, supra note 7, at A01 (discussing New Jersey dioceses' willingness to settle clergy sexual abuse claims).
236. See PatersonDiocese, supra note 209, at IA (reporting that New Jersey dioceses expended $12.8 million in settlements and victims' counseling).
237. See Schultz, 472 A.2d at 539 (expressing opinion that charitable immunity
may become inappropriate as new theories of liability develop).
238. See S. 540, 211th Leg., 2004-05 Sess. (N.J. 2004) (proposing amendment
to New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act that would allow victims to sue charitable
organizations where organizations' negligence allowed sexual abuse of minors to
occur). For a discussion of proposed amendments to the Charitable Immunity
Act, see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
239. See Chadwick, supra note 7, at A01 (noting that diocesan officials oppose
amending Charitable Immunity Act because of potential costs and because they
have already taken action to solve clergy sexual abuse crisis).
240. See id. (explaining that in spite of Charitable Immunity Act, New Jersey
dioceses still enter into expensive settlement claims); Paterson Diocese, supra note
209, at IA (reporting total amount expended by New Jersey dioceses for settlements and victims' counseling).
241. See Chopko, supra note 4, at 1090 n.l (explaining that charitable beneficiaries cannot sue charitable entities under theory of negligence); see, e.g., Schultz,
472 A.2d at 536 (holding that Charitable Immunity Act precludes archdiocese liability in negligent hiring action stemming from clergy sexual abuse).
242. See Chadwick, supra note 7, at A01 (pointing out that, although New
Jersey dioceses have settled claims, state courts continue to uphold charitable immunity, which prevents lawsuits against church from moving forward).
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the Charitable Immunity Act exacerbates the harm inflicted by clergy sex2 43
ual abuse.
Samantha Kluxen LaBarbera

243. See id. (recounting two-fold injury in Schultz). Christopher Schultz's
brother, Richard, summed up the impact of the court's decision by explaining that
"his family was destroyed [first] by his brother's [suicide] and then by the court's
decision [to apply the Charitable Immunity Act]." Id.
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